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2209 
COMMENTS 
CARPENTER V. UNITED STATES AND THE 
EMERGING EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN 
DATA COMPREHENSIVENESS APPLIED TO 
BROWSING HISTORY 
DANIEL DE ZAYAS∗ 
The third-party doctrine has transcended the shift from analog to digital 
technology.  Despite judicial cautions that the doctrine is unfit for the digital 
age, it persists as one of privacy’s greatest limitations.  However, in Carpenter 
v. United States, the Supreme Court significantly circumscribed the third-
party doctrine.  Although the Court explicitly limited its holding to historical 
cell-site location information, Carpenter paves the way for enhancing 
expectations of privacy in many types of data. 
This Comment argues that Carpenter applies to browsing history collected 
by third-party cookies; therefore, individuals have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in their browsing history that is unabridged by the third-party doctrine.  
Like historical cell-site location information, browsing history collected by third-
party cookies is comprehensively detailed and collected involuntarily and 
pervasively.  In arguing that Carpenter applies beyond the Court’s feeble 
restraints, this Comment derives an emerging expectation of privacy in the 
comprehensiveness of data from the Court’s repeated focus on how granular 
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data can reveal personal information.  An expectation of privacy that turns 
on the comprehensiveness of data offers new grounds to strengthen privacy 
online and in the digital age. 
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The internet is the most liberating tool for humanity ever invented, and 
also the best for surveillance.  It’s not one or the other.  It’s both. 
 
—John Perry Barlow1 
INTRODUCTION 
When internet users think about their internet profiles, they 
typically think about their social media profiles on sites like Facebook 
and Twitter.  But what about their profiles with online advertising and 
marketing companies like Google AdSense and DoubleClick or Acxiom?  
These profiles may include information that internet users have shared 
publicly, such as their age and sex,2 but may also contain information 
that internet users have never shared nor wished to share, such as 
political affiliations, religious beliefs, or sexual orientation.3  What feeds 
these databases?  The answer is short and sweet:  cookies.4  Specifically, 
tracking cookies5 allow third-party companies without any direct 
relation to internet users to collect, inter alia, internet users’ browsing 
history to ascertain or infer information about them.6 
Although these profiles and databases serve legitimate purposes for 
internet advertising,7 they raise significant privacy concerns because 
                                               
 1. James Ball, Hacktivists in the Frontline Battle for the Internet, GUARDIAN (Apr. 20, 2012, 
8:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2012/apr/20/ hacktivists-battle-
internet [https://perma.cc/XCR9-WKWJ]. 
 2. ALEECIA M. MCDONALD & LORRIE FAITH CRANOR, BELIEFS AND BEHAVIORS:  
INTERNET USERS’ UNDERSTANDING OF BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING 9–10 (2010), http:// 
aleecia.com/authors-drafts/tprc-behav-AV.pdf [https://perma.cc/WWD5-P6LJ]. 
 3. See infra notes 39, 42–45 and accompanying text (explaining how Facebook 
“Like” buttons can be used to infer information). 
 4. A cookie is a small text file that an internet user’s internet browser or software program 
saves to the user’s computer.  TOBY MENDEL ET AL., GLOBAL SURVEY ON INTERNET PRIVACY AND 
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 14 (2012); Online Tracking, FTC CONSUMER INFO., 
https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0042-online-tracking#understanding_cookies 
[https://perma.cc/X978-RRFQ] [hereinafter Online Tracking]. 
 5. Throughout this Comment, “tracking cookie” refers specifically to third-party 
tracking cookies.  See infra Section II.A (distinguishing first-party cookies and third-
party cookies); see also FRANZISKA ROESNER ET AL., DETECTING AND DEFENDING AGAINST 
THIRD-PARTY TRACKING ON THE WEB 7 3–4 (2012) (noting that a tracking cookie can be a 
first-party or third-party cookie depending on what website the user is currently accessing). 
 6. See infra notes 35–45 and accompanying text (explaining how third-party 
advertising companies and data brokers use third-party cookies). 
 7. See, e.g., Sophie C. Boerman et al., Online Behavioral Advertising:  A Literature 
Review and Research Agenda, 46 J. ADVERT. 363, 363 (2017) (noting that monitoring 
and collecting internet users’ online behavior allows advertisers to solicit individually 
targeted advertisements to optimize a business’s returns on digital advertisements); 
Google Analytics Cookie Usage on Websites, GOOGLE, 
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they become “one-stop shops” for the government to mine internet 
users’ browsing history and other personal information.8  Internet 
users and companies are legally restrained and financially 
disincentivized from challenging these government practices, 
marring the privacy landscape with a void of privacy protections.9 
Generally, the government must obtain a search warrant to acquire 
the contents of electronic communications;10 however, the same 
requirement does not apply to browsing history collected by tracking 
                                               
https://developers.google.com/analytics/devguides/collection/analyticsjs/cookie-
usage?hl=en [https://perma.cc/NSS9-LT3A] (last updated Aug. 9, 2018) (noting 
that first-party cookies identify new users, count user re-visits, log which sites visitors 
come from, and track how long they use a website).  But see Robert Heaton, How Does 
Online Tracking Actually Work?, ROBERT HEATON (Nov. 20, 2017), 
https://robertheaton.com/2017/11/20/how-does-online-tracking-actually-work 
[https://perma.cc/W38B-6MVQ] (arguing that cookies are unnecessary because 
website server logs generate the same information). 
 8. Ashkan Soltani et al., NSA Uses Google Cookies to Pinpoint Targets for Hacking, 
WASH. POST (Dec. 10, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
switch/wp/2013/12/10/nsa-uses-google-cookies-to-pinpoint-targets-for-
hacking/?utm_term=.5364b200ccbe [https://perma.cc/9YMV-RPWZ] (“‘[W]e need 
to track everyone for advertising’ translates into the government being able to track 
everyone everywhere.” (quoting Chris Hoofnagle, Professor, University of California 
Berkeley School of Law)). 
 9. See Jennifer Daskal, Notice and Standing in the Fourth Amendment:  Searches of 
Personal Data, 26 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 437, 439–41 (2017) (observing that the 
government may delay notifying an individual that his information has been 
searched, as well as obtain a gag order to enjoin third-party providers from notifying 
the individual); EU “e-Evidence” Proposals Turn Service Providers into Judicial Authorities, 
(Apr. 17, 2018), https://edri.org/eu-e-evidence-proposals-turn-service-providers-
into-judicial-authorities [https://perma.cc/WEL7-XRAL] (highlighting that 
companies, unlike states, are not legally obligated to defend individuals’ privacy 
rights); Eleni Kyriades, Digital Free for All Part Deux:  European Commission Proposal on 
E-Evidence, JUST SECURITY (May 17, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/56408/ 
digital-free-part-deux-european-commission-proposal-e-evidence 
[https://perma.cc/NY47-WGWD] (noting that companies are not economically 
incentivized to protect individuals’ privacy rights).  A recent study highlights the 
vulnerability of internet users’ privacy, reporting that 45% of the 600 websites 
analyzed did not require the government to obtain a subpoena or warrant before 
disclosing users’ personally identifiable information.  RAZIEH NOKHBEH ZAEEM & K. 
SUZANNE BARBER, A STUDY OF WEB PRIVACY POLICIES ACROSS INDUSTRIES 10 (2018). 
 10. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3)(a) 
(2012) (prescribing that any “person or entity providing an electronic 
communication service to the public shall not intentionally divulge the contents of 
any communication (other than one to such person or entity, or an agent thereof) 
while in transmission on that service to any person or entity other than an addressee 
or intended recipient of such communication or an agent of such addressee or intended 
recipient”); see also In re Zynga Privacy Litig., 750 F.3d 1098, 1106–07 (9th Cir. 2014) 
(interpreting “content” under 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3)(a) as excluding browsing history). 
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cookies and possessed by third-party companies.11  This discrepancy 
can be attributed to the third-party doctrine, which mandates that a 
person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
information voluntarily conveyed to third-parties.12  Courts developed 
the third-party doctrine in a series of cases during the age of analog 
technology and left it almost undisturbed as society transitioned into 
the modern digital age.13  However, scholars, Supreme Court Justices, 
and even the attorney who successfully argued a seminal third-party 
doctrine case, have questioned the doctrine’s viability in the digital age.14 
On June 22, 2018, the Supreme Court loosened the third-party 
doctrine’s antiquated grasp over the digital-age when it decided 
Carpenter v. United States,15 declining to extend the third-party doctrine 
to a phone user’s historical cell-site location information (“CSLI”) 
conveyed to third-party cell-phone providers.16  The Court denoted 
historical CSLI as a “distinct category of information” in which phone 
users enjoy an unabridged expectation of privacy and recognized that 
historical CSLI is not voluntarily conveyed to cell-phone providers.17  
                                               
 11. See infra Section II.C.2 (identifying the privacy frameworks applicable to 
browsing history and tracking cookies). 
 12. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (holding that even if one 
exhibits a subjective expectation of privacy in information voluntarily conveyed to a 
third party, such an expectation “is not one that society is prepared to recognize as 
‘reasonable’” (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967))). 
 13. Infra Section II.B.2. 
 14. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring) (advancing that the third-party doctrine is “ill suited to the digital age”); 
Erin Murphy, The Case Against the Case for Third-Party Doctrine:  A Response to Epstein and 
Kerr, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1239, 1252 (2009) (scrutinizing several justifications and 
explanations of the third-party doctrine and suggesting a reconceptualized third-
party doctrine that requires the government to obtain a warrant to access an 
individual’s private disclosures to a third-party); Stephen H. Sachs, The Supreme Court’s 
Privacy Precedent Is Outdated, WASH. POST (Nov. 26, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-supreme-courts-privacy-precedent-
is-outdated/2017/11/26/fe9d1dd0-cfb2-11e7-81bc-
c55a220c8cbe_story.html?utm_term=.0c0f9658495a [https://perma.cc/7XVH-
TTUY] (statement of Stephen H. Sachs, Counsel for Maryland, Smith v. Maryland) 
(stating that “[Smith v. Maryland] has long since outlived its suitability as precedent” and 
that “no one involved in the case could foresee the digital revolution that was to come”). 
 15. 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018), rev’g 819 F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 2016). 
 16. Id. at 2217 n.3, 2219 (holding that the government must obtain a search 
warrant to access seven days of historical CSLI). 
 17. Id. at 2219. 
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Despite the Court’s monumental decision, its broad reasoning left 
several questions unanswered—including the decision’s true scope.18 
This Comment argues that courts should interpret the holding in 
Carpenter v. United States to require the government to obtain a warrant 
before acquiring browsing history collected by tracking cookies 
because internet users have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their 
browsing history, and browsing history is not subject to a reduced 
expectation of privacy nor voluntarily conveyed by tracking cookies. 
Part I.A explains the nuances and functions of cookies, and Part I.B 
highlights practical concerns about tracking cookies.19  Part II.A.1 
briefly surveys various conceptualizations of privacy before Part II.A.2 
reviews the evolution of the Fourth Amendment, specifically from its 
early precepts to recent technology-oriented jurisprudence.20  Parts 
II.B–C delineate how the misplaced trust doctrine influenced the 
third-party doctrine and identifies how the third-party doctrine limits 
privacy interests online.21  Next, Parts II.D–E unpack Carpenter v. United 
States and its implications, positing that the Court’s reasoning indicates 
that Carpenter’s scope reaches far beyond its limited holding.22  Part III.A 
draws upon technology-oriented Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to 
advance an emerging expectation of privacy in the comprehensiveness 
of the information sought and illustrates how this expectation remedies 
complex, nuanced, and inadequate privacy frameworks while affording 
privacy interests to browsing history.23  Part III.B.1–2 argues that the 
third-party doctrine does not apply to browsing history collected by 
tracking cookies.24  Finally, Part III.C recommends interpreting the 
third-party doctrine more closely to its misplaced trust doctrinal roots 
to inhibit the government from appropriating the private sector for 
retrospective information and to reform the third-party doctrine.25  
This Comment concludes that courts should interpret Carpenter as 
rendering the third-party doctrine inapplicable to browsing history 
collected by tracking cookies to revitalize Fourth Amendment 
protections in the digital age. 
                                               
 18. Infra Section II.E (highlighting how courts have navigated applications of the 
third-party doctrine post-Carpenter to other types of data beyond historical CSLI). 
 19. Infra Sections II.A; II.B. 
 20. Infra Section II.A.1–2. 
 21. Infra Section II.B–C. 
 22. Infra Section II.D–E. 
 23. Infra Section III.A. 
 24. Infra Section III.B.1–2. 
 25. Infra Section III.C. 
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I.    WHAT ARE COOKIES AND ONLINE PROFILING? 
Strengthening online privacy rights first requires identifying and 
understanding how information is collected online.  The following 
sections explain how internet users encounter and acquire cookies 
and proceeds to distinguish between distinct types of cookies.  Not 
every cookie threatens internet users’ privacy; in fact, many cookies 
provide benign conveniences that facilitate online activity.  
Understanding cookies will help identify when and how cookies 
hinder internet users’ control over their personal information. 
A.   Cookies and Online Tracking 
A cookie is a small text file that an internet user’s internet browser 
or software program saves to the internet user’s computer.26  
Generally, an internet user’s browser acquires cookies during the 
technological exchange between the user’s browser and a webpage that the 
user directs the browser to access.  When a user attempts to access a 
webpage, the user’s browser sends the website’s server a message, called a 
Hypertext Transfer Protocol (“HTTP”) request, asking the server to provide 
the content of the webpage for the user’s browser to load, thus providing 
“access” to the webpage.27  While providing the requested content, the 
website’s server also provides “any cookies it would like [the user’s] browser 
to have,” which are stored in a cookie file in the user’s browser.28  Each 
cookie generates a unique ID number for the user and records the website 
to which the cookie belongs.29  When the user revisits the website, the 
user’s browser attaches the cookies to every future HTTP request the 
browser makes to the website.30 
There are three main types of cookies:  first-party cookies, third-party 
cookies (tracking cookies),31 and Flash cookies.  In 1994, Netscape 
engineer Lou Montulli invented the first-party cookie—a cookie 
                                               
 26. MENDEL ET AL., supra note 4; Online Tracking, supra note 4. 
 27. Heaton, supra note 7. 
 28. Marshall Brain, How Internet Cookies Work:  How Do Web Sites Use Cookies?, 
HOWSTUFFWORKS, https://computer.howstuffworks.com/cookie3.htm [https:// 
perma.cc/RA39-EY7J]; Heaton, supra note 7. 
 29. Heaton, supra note 7; see also What Information Is in a Cookie?, 
ALLABOUTCOOKIES.ORG, http://www.allaboutcookies.org/cookies/what-information 
-in-cookie.html [https://perma.cc/M9T8-6DMT] (noting that cookies containing 
personal identifying information are generally encrypted for protection). 
 30. Heaton, supra note 7. 
 31. First- and third-party cookies are both technically Hypertext Markup 
Language (HTML) cookies.  PETER SWIRE & DEBRAE KENNEDY-MAYO, U.S. PRIVATE-
SECTOR PRIVACY:  LAW AND PRACTICE FOR INFORMATION PRIVACY PROFESSIONALS 119 
(Julia Homer ed., 2d ed. 2018). 
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placed on a computer from the website visited32—to give e-commerce 
stores the personal touch they lacked compared to real stores.33  First-
party cookies allow a website to remember a user’s name, login 
information, preferences, and items in an online shopping cart.34 
Third-party cookies are cookies belonging to a website other than 
the website the user is currently accessing.35  Infamously known as 
“tracking cookies,” companies without any direct relationship to an 
internet user, such as advertising companies or web analytic firms, use 
these cookies to monitor users’ browsing history across different 
websites.36  By placing their tracking cookies on websites within their 
advertising network, these companies can track internet users across 
websites and record their browsing history.37  Companies then use this 
information to identify a user’s interests and to tailor advertisements 
to those interests, ultimately enhancing the likelihood that a user will 
purchase a good or service, and consequently increasing revenue for 
advertisers and advertisement publishers.38 
                                               
 32. ROESNER ET AL., supra note 5, at 3–4. 
 33. See Solveig Singleton, How Cookie-Gate Crumbles, CATO INST. (July 11, 2000), 
https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/how-cookiegate-crumbles 
[https://perma.cc/5PDW-7AJS] (stating that, without information about visitors, 
websites view return customers as anonymous strangers); see also Viktor Mayer-
Schönberger, Demystifying Lessig, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 713, 741 (positing that the original 
cookies were invented to remedy short-term, single session problems like website 
“statelessness” and lack of personalization, as well as to facilitate voting). 
 34. Online Tracking, supra note 4. 
 35. ROESNER ET AL., supra note 5, at 2. 
 36. Chris Jay Hoofnagle et al., Behavioral Advertising:  The Offer You Cannot Refuse, 
6 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 273, 276 (2012); Benjamin Strauss, Online Tracking:  Can the 
Free Market Create Choice Where None Exists?, 13 CHIC.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 539, 541 
(2014); see ROESNER ET AL., supra note 5, at 3 (explaining that “tracker” cookie is more 
technically accurate because “a given cookie can be considered a first-party or a third-
party cookie depending on the current browsing context”). 
 37. GERTJAN FRANKEN ET AL., WHO LEFT OPEN THE COOKIE JAR?  A COMPREHENSIVE 
EVALUATION OF THIRD-PARTY COOKIE POLICIES 153 (2018). 
 38. See Back to the Basics:  What is Behavioral Targeting?, LOTAME (Sept. 17, 2018), 
https://www.lotame.com/what-is-behavioral-targeting [https://perma.cc/BM6C-
AZEY] (explaining how targeted advertising, or “behavioral advertising,” benefits the 
advertising technology industry and consumers); see also J. HOWARD BEALES & JEFFREY 
A. EISENACH, NAVIGANT ECONS., AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE VALUE OF INFORMATION 
SHARING IN THE MARKET FOR ONLINE CONTENT 1, 8–9 (2014), http://images.politico 
.com/global/2014/02/09/beales_eisenach_daa_study.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4HGW-YUMG] (concluding that advertisers may pay 
advertisement publishers 200% more to deliver a tailored advertisement to a user).  
But see VERONICA MAROTTA ET AL., ONLINE TRACKING AND PUBLISHERS’ REVENUES:  AN 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 20, 27 (forthcoming 2019), https://weis2019.econinfosec.org/ 
wp-content/uploads/sites/6/2019/05/WEIS_2019_paper_38.pdf 
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Generally, an internet user acquires a tracking cookie without ever 
visiting the third-party’s website.  For example, when an internet user 
visits a website featuring a Facebook “Like” button, tracking cookies 
embedded in the button automatically prompt Facebook’s servers to 
check whether the user’s HTTP request contains its tracking cookie.39  
If the request does not contain Facebook’s tracking cookie, the user’s 
browser saves a new tracking cookie on the user’s computer, and 
Facebook creates an advertising profile for the user.40  When the internet 
user next submits an HTTP request to that website or another website 
featuring Facebook tracking cookies, Facebook’s server recognizes 
the user’s tracking cookie and records the user’s browsing history in 
its profile of the user.41 
After recording the user’s browsing history, companies analyze the 
data to ascertain or infer personal information, such as the user’s age, 
sex, sexual orientation, physical location, occupation, educational 
level, and interests, to supplement the user’s profile.42  These 
seemingly innocuous individual inferences gradually paint detailed 
profiles about users.43  Companies may also infer personal 
                                               
[https://perma.cc/4DNH-BHMG] (challenging the economic efficacy of behavioral 
tracking and reporting that behavioral advertising increases advertisement 
publishers’ revenues by 4% per advertisement). 
 39. See Daniel Kahn Gillmore, Facebook Is Tracking Me Even Though I’m Not on 
Facebook, ACLU (Apr. 5, 2018), https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/ 
internet-privacy/facebook-tracking-me-even-though-im-not-facebook 
[https://perma.cc/5AER-8DPC] (noting that a Facebook “Like” button on another 
website enables Facebook to record the website on which a user encountered the 
“Like” button as well as additional browsing history); see also Facebook, Social Media 
Privacy, and the Use and Abuse of Data, Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and 
Transport. and the S. Comm. on Judiciary, 115th Cong. 23 (2018), 
https://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF00/20180411/108090/HHRG-115-IF00-
Wstate-ZuckerbergM-20180411.pdf [https://perma.cc/6T6A-6UH7] (statement of 
Mark Zuckerberg, CEO, Facebook) (disclosing that, in addition to the “Like” button, 
the Facebook “Share” button, which is embedded on 931,000 non-Facebook websites, 
also sets tracking cookies). 
 40. Gillmore, supra note 37. 
 41. Id. 
 42. MCDONALD & CRANOR, supra note 2, at 2; see Michal Kosinski et al., Private 
Traits and Attributes Are Predictable from Digital Records of Human Behavior, 110 PROC. 
NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 5802, 5803 (2013) (reporting that, by analyzing participants’ 
Facebook “Likes,” researchers correctly discerned 88% of the participants’ sexual 
orientation and 85% of participants’ political associations). 
 43. See FTC, DATA BROKERS:  A CALL FOR TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 46, 
48–49 (2014) (acknowledging that data brokers collect, analyze, and utilize 
information about an internet user to create valuable, “detailed composite[s] of the 
consumer’s life”); Soltani et al., supra note 8 (reporting that the NSA has used cookies 
to identify and target a suspect for remote hacking). 
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information and associations that an internet user has not otherwise 
shared by cross-referencing their compiled user profiles with 
information from other companies.44 
Most consumers are unaware of these data practices;45 however, 
websites are increasingly notifying internet users about their cookie 
practices, as well as requiring them to “opt-in,” to comply with the recently 
implemented General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”).46 
Finally, Flash cookies, referring to Adobe Flash Player, are special 
cookies that regenerate deleted tracking cookies.47  Flash cookies are 
saved in a location separate from tracking cookies,48 shielding Flash 
                                               
 44. EMILEE RADER, AWARENESS OF BEHAVIOR TRACKING AND INFORMATION PRIVACY 
CONCERN IN FACEBOOK AND GOOGLE 59 (2014); see Charles Duhigg, How Companies 
Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2012), https://www.nytimes. 
com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html [https://perma.cc/64JU-W572] 
(recalling that Target marketing employees asked a Target statistician, “If we wanted to 
figure out if a customer is pregnant, even if she didn’t want us to know, can you do that?”). 
 45. FTC, supra note 43, at 46. 
 46. Council Regulation (EU) 2016/679, pmbl., of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to 
the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and 
repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 
119) ¶ 1, ¶ 32 [hereinafter GDPR] (requiring websites to give clear, concise, and 
non-disruptive notice and to receive affirmative and unambiguous consent from an 
internet user before collecting “personal data” about the internet user).  Under the 
GDPR, “personal data” refers to, in relevant part, any information about an identifiable 
natural person who may be directly or indirectly identified by an identification number 
or online identifier.  Id. art. 4, ¶ 1.  The GDPR explicitly recognizes “cookie identifiers” 
under the “personal data” umbrella, noting that cookie identifiers “may be used to create 
profiles of the natural persons and identify them.”  Id. pmbl. ¶ 30. 
 47. Elspeth A. Brotherton, Big Brother Gets a Makeover:  Behavioral Targeting and the 
Third-Party Doctrine, 61 EMORY L.J. 555, 564 (2012); Online Tracking, supra note 4.  
Likened to “a normal browser cookie on steroids,” Flash cookies have greater capacity 
and more features than first and third-party cookies.  See An Introduction to Flash 
Cookies; How to Manage Them, PRACT. ECOMMERCE (Mar. 16, 2011), 
https://www.practicalecommerce.com/An-Introduction-to-Flash-Cookies-How-to-Manage-
Them [https://perma.cc/P39M-93VE].  For example, Flash cookies generally store 
twenty-five times more data than first- and third-party cookies.  ALEECIA M. MCDONALD 
& LORRIE FAITH CRANOR, A SURVEY OF ADOBE FLASH LOCAL SHARED OBJECTS TO 
RESPAWN HTTP COOKIES 3 (2011). 
Additionally, unlike first- and third-party cookies that may eventually expire, Flash 
cookies do not expire or delete unless an internet user finds and deletes the cookies.  
Id. 
 48. Flash cookies are stored offline in Adobe Flash Player.  Online Tracking, supra 
note 4.  One of the only ways to manage and delete Flash cookie is to visit Adobe’s 
website.  Flash Player Help, ADOBE, http://www.macromedia.com/support/ 
documentation/en/flashplayer/help/settings_manager07.html [https://perma.cc 
/YG5R-U8U9]. 
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cookies from most users’ attempts to delete their cookies and 
ensuring the Flash cookies can regenerate deleted tracking cookies in 
all internet browsers on a computer.49 
B.   Practical Concerns Raised by Tracking Cookies 
Tracking cookies have fundamentally diverged from the original 
purpose of cookies and now raise significant privacy concerns as 
Americans increasingly use the internet.50  First, tracking cookies have 
enabled websites and advertisers to track internet users and to create 
concentrated databases of profiles of billions of people.51  While some 
databases may be obvious, such as Facebook’s collection of profiles of 
1.65 billion individuals, other databases, like AddThis’s profiles of 1.9 
billion people, are less apparent.52  Similarly, tracking cookies are 
rampant across the internet, thus ensuring that internet users’ 
browsing history will be tracked.53 
                                               
 49. ASHKAN SOLTANI ET AL., FLASH COOKIES AND PRIVACY 158 (2009) (advising that 
erasing a browser’s cookies, cache, search history, and private data will not delete 
Flash cookies); see MCDONALD & CRANOR, supra note 47. 
 50. See Monica Anderson et al., 10% of Americans Don’t Use the Internet.  Who Are 
They?, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 22, 2019), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2018/03/05/some-americans-dont-use-the-internet-who-are-they 
[https://perma.cc/9QMQ-35G3] (documenting that 90% of Americans now use the 
internet compared to only 52% in 2000); see also Andrew Perrin & Jingjing Jiang, About a 
Quarter of U.S. Adults Say They Are “Almost Constantly” Online, PEW RES. CTR. (Mar. 14, 2018), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/03/14/about-a-quarter-of-americans-
report-going-online-almost-constantly [https://perma.cc/DWB7-2B5S] (reporting that 
77% of Americans use the internet daily, 43% use the internet several times a day, and 
26% use the internet “almost constantly”).  Compare, e.g., Shayndi Raice & Julia Angwin, 
Facebook ‘Unfair’ on Privacy, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 30, 2011), https://www.wsj.com 
/articles/SB10001424052970203441704577068400622644374 (“The very fundamental 
business model of Facebook is to collect information about you and use it to sell ads.”), 
with supra note 33 (explaining how cookies initially only brought personalization to a 
business model). 
 51. See Ibrahim Altaweel et al., Web Privacy Census, J. TECH. SCI. (Dec. 15, 2015), 
https://techscience.org/a/2015121502 [https://perma.cc/SYK6-NZ75] (finding 
Google tracking technology on “92 of the top 100 most popular websites and on 923 
of the top 1,000 websites”). 
 52. Boerman et al., supra note 7, at 364; see also Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power:  
Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1412 
(2001) (recalling that, in 1999, Google DoubleClick had profiles for eighty million 
customers).  See generally Nurie Mohamed, You Deleted Your Cookies?  Think Again, 
WIRED (Aug. 10, 2009), https://www.wired.com/2009/08/you-deleted-your-cookies-
think-again [https://perma.cc/BS9V-E29J] (noting that 300,000 companies use 
AddThis for ad placement). 
 53. See Altaweel et al., supra note 51 (finding that the top 100 internet sites 
contained 6280 cookies—83% of which were third-party cookies); MCDONALD & 
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Similarly, the inability to opt out of tracking cookie data collection 
exacerbates privacy concerns raised by these databases.  If internet users 
read a website’s privacy policy and wish to remove the tracking and Flash 
cookies lodged in their computers, most website privacy policies do not 
identify or disclose discreet third-party data collectors, thus rendering 
most internet users’ choices about their data sharing “[i]nvisible and 
[i]ncomplete.”54  Moreover, most attempts to remove or inhibit the 
collection of tracking cookies are futile.  This futility is due, in part, to 
Flash cookies that regenerate deleted cookies, unbeknownst to users.55  
Similarly, “Do Not Track” settings56 in internet browsers have failed 
because companies are not legally required to honor “Do Not Track” 
requests.57  Accordingly, many companies explicitly state in their privacy 
policies that they do not honor “Do Not Track” requests.58 
                                               
CRANOR, supra note 2, at 2 (highlighting that Google tracks about 90% of internet 
users). 
 54. TIMOTHY LIBERT, AN AUTOMATED APPROACH TO AUDITING DISCLOSURE OF 
THIRD-PARTY DATA COLLECTION IN WEBSITE PRIVACY POLICIES 211 (2018) (reporting 
that, while an average of 22% of website privacy policies disclosed that user 
information would be conveyed to Google, Facebook, or Twitter, only 0.3% of privacy 
policies disclosed that user information would be conveyed to Acxiom); see FTC, supra 
note 43, at 49. 
 55. See supra notes 47–49 (detailing the discreet and strategic use of Flash 
cookies); see also Brotherton, supra note 47, at 563 (noting that ad networks have 
implemented mechanisms to prevent users from removing tracking cookies).  
Furthermore, even if astute internet users visit third-parties’ websites to opt out of 
their cookie practices, their efforts may be stymied by unclear and confusing opt-out 
choices.  See FTC, supra note 43, at 49 (noting that data brokers’ websites are not 
“consumer-facing,” obfuscating internet users’ ability to control whether or how their 
information is collected). 
 56. When activated, the “Do Not Track” setting prompts an internet user’s 
browser to request that each website that an internet user visits does not track the 
user.  See Brotherton, supra note 47, at 569 (comparing the “Do Not Track” setting to 
the Do Not Call list for telemarketing). 
 57. See Online Tracking, supra note 4 (noting that a company is only legally 
obligated to fulfill “Do Not Track” requests if the company commits to honoring 
them).  Although there have been coordinated efforts to standardize and regulate 
“Do Not Track” requests, these too have proven unsuccessful.  See Do Not Track, ELEC. 
FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/issues/do-not-track [https://perma.cc 
/2M7V-SWBA] (noting that negotiations to standardize “Do Not Track” practices 
collapsed when the Digital Advertising Alliance—to which companies, such as 
Google, Facebook, and Microsoft belong—withdrew from the negotiations); see also 
Consumer Watchdog Petition for Rulemaking to Require Edge Providers to Honor ‘Do Not 
Track’ Requests, 30 FCC Rcd. 12424 (2015) (dismissing a petition to regulate edge 
providers [suppliers of content], reaffirming that “[t]he [FCC] has been unequivocal 
in declaring that it has no intent to regulate edge providers”). 
 58. See, e.g., Privacy Policy, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/en/privacy [https:// 
perma.cc/8HUT-C3TZ] (“We do not support the Do Not Track browser option.”); 
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II.    LEGAL FRAMEWORKS APPLICABLE TO BROWSING HISTORY AND 
COOKIES 
To understand the privacy interests in browsing history, Part II.A briefly 
surveys evolving conceptions of privacy before charting the sea changes in 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence between privacy grounded in property 
rights versus “expectations of privacy.”  Part II.B identifies the limitations 
on privacy rights under modern interpretations of the Fourth 
Amendment and the third-party doctrine, and Part II.C.1–2 explores the 
privacy interests recognized within the doctrine’s confines.  Part II.D–E 
unpacks the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Carpenter v. United States, 
explaining the Court’s curtailment of the third-party doctrine as applied 
to historical CSLI and stoking the debate that Carpenter’s holding applies 
to additional types of information. 
A.   Privacy and the Fourth Amendment 
Defining “privacy” has long eluded precise resolve.  Despite its perennial 
value that predates the United States’ founding, “[f]ew values so 
fundamental to society as privacy have been left so undefined.”59  Although 
privacy remains undefined today, surveying various conceptualizations of 
privacy in American history may elucidate its core tenets. 
1. Evolving conceptions of privacy 
In the colonial era, privacy safeguarded four aspects of individualism:  
“personal autonomy, emotional release, self-evaluation, and limited and 
protected communication.”60  In 1890, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis 
                                               
Privacy Statement, NETFLIX, https://help.netflix.com/legal/privacy [https://perma. 
cc/YXY8-KP2K] (“At this time, we do not respond to Web browser ‘do not track’ 
signals”); Target Privacy Policy, TARGET, https://www.target.com/c/target-privacy-
policy/-/N-4sr7p [https://perma.cc/T98X-YGCC] (disclosing that “we do not 
respond to browser ‘do not track’ signals,”  but users may “opt out of interest-based 
advertising”).  Additionally, Google and Facebook have both announced that they do 
not honor “Do Not Track Requests” because internet users do not understand what 
“do not track” actually means.  Elise Ackerman, Google and Facebook Ignore “Do Not 
Track Requests, Claim They Confuse Consumers, FORBES (Feb. 27, 2013), https:// 
www.forbes.com/sites/eliseackerman/2013/02/27/big-internet-companies-struggle-
over-proper-response-to-consumers-do-not-track-requests [https://perma.cc/SC3C-JE4P] 
(identifying concerns that honoring “Do Not Track” requests may impede features that 
consumers did not intend to change and, consequently, not meet users’ expectations). 
 59. ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967).  While no definitive answer 
explains why privacy is not mentioned in the Constitution, “[t]o define is to limit” 
and perhaps its absence is an intentional safeguard for the right to privacy.  See OSCAR 
WILDE, THE PICTURE OF DORIAN GRAY 148 (1890). 
 60. DAVID H. FLAHERTY, PRIVACY IN COLONIAL NEW ENGLAND 3 (1972).  More 
specifically, privacy protected colonists from having to disclose their personalities, 
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(later Justice Brandeis) defined the right to privacy as the “right of the 
individual to be let alone.”61  Seventy years later, William Prosser categorized 
privacy cases into four distinct torts:  intruding into another’s solitude, 
publicly disclosing another’s embarrassing private details, misrepresenting 
another’s public image, and advantageously appropriating another’s 
likeness.62  In 1967, Professor Alan Westin denoted privacy as “the claim of 
individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, 
and to what extent information about them is communicated to others.”63 
Recently, Daniel Solove has posited that privacy touches many facets of 
life as pluralistic protections against a set of problems that “do not share one 
element in common but that nevertheless bear a resemblance to each 
other.”64  While privacy persists as a “Cheshire cat of values,” it continues to 
indelibly influence American jurisprudence and society.65 
 
                                               
thus “expos[ing themselves] to the shame of total understanding.”  Id. at 4.  Privacy 
also championed the sanctity of emotional release, providing a colonist refuge from 
the stresses of daily life and social norms.  See id. at 4 (quoting DIARY AND 
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF JOHN ADAMS, I, 96 (L. H. Butterfield ed., 1961)). 
I must converse and deal with Mankind, and move and stir from one scene 
of Action and Debate and Business, and Pleasure, and Conversation, to 
another and grow weary all before I shall feel the strong Desire of retiring to 
contemplation on Men and Business and Pleasure and Books.  After hard 
Labour at Husbandry, Reading and Reflection in Retirement will be a Relief 
and a high refined Pleasure. 
Id. (quoting John Adams).  In addition, privacy safeguarded an individual’s ability to 
reflect upon experiences, events, and religious engagements.  Id.  Finally, privacy 
fostered open and safe communication with others without fear that the 
communications would be leaked to the public, thus allowing an individual to 
maintain distinct interpersonal relationships.  Id. at 4–5. 
 61. Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 
200, 211 (1890) (identifying the inadequacies of the existing privacy protections 
afforded by contract law and property law). 
 62. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960). 
 63. WESTIN, supra note 59. 
 64. See Daniel J. Solove, “I’ve Got Nothing to Hide” and Other Misunderstandings of 
Privacy, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 745, 756, 763 (2007) (reconciling conceptualizations of 
privacy that disregard that “not all privacy problems are equal” and that privacy’s 
values depend on the problem or harm at issue). 
 65. But see JONATHAN FRANZEN, Imperial Bedroom, in HOW TO BE ALONE:  ESSAYS 42 
(2002) (describing privacy as “the rallying cry of activists fighting for reproductive 
rights, against stalkers, for the right to die, against a national health-care database, 
for stronger data-encryption standards, against paparazzi, for the sanctity of employer e-
mail, and against employee drug testing,” but “[o]n closer examination, though, privacy 
proves to be the Cheshire cat of values:  not much substance, but a very winning smile”). 
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2. Evolution of the Fourth Amendment 
Although neither the Constitution nor the Bill of Rights mention 
the word “privacy,” the Fourth Amendment is one implicit 
manifestation of the amorphous notion of privacy.66  The Fourth 
Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures” absent a warrant issued upon a showing of probable cause.67 
The Court’s early Fourth Amendment jurisprudence interpreted 
the Fourth Amendment through a property-rights framework.68  
However, in 1967, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence evolved when the 
Court decided Katz v. United States,69 introducing the reasonable 
expectation of privacy test in holding that the government conducted an 
unreasonable search when it recorded the contents of the defendant’s 
phone conversation in a public telephone booth.70  In rejecting the 
defendant’s property-based privacy arguments,71 the Court clarified that 
“the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.”72 
In his concurrence, Justice Harlan introduced the two-pronged 
“reasonable expectation of privacy” Katz test that has become the 
                                               
 66. See id. (recognizing that the Third and Fifth Amendments also implicitly 
address privacy). 
 67. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 68. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 456–57, 465–66 (1928) 
(declining to extend the Fourth Amendment to wiretapped telephone lines located 
outside the defendants’ properties, holding that the government did not conduct a 
search or seizure because the government did not search or seize any person, papers, 
or “tangible material effects”), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); 
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634–35, 638 (1886) (invoking both the Fourth 
and Fifth Amendments to hold that the compulsory production of a person’s papers 
to substantiate a criminal charge against that person constitutes an unreasonable 
search and seizure). 
 69. 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967), superseded by statute, Title III of the Omnibus Crime 
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (1968). 
 70. See id. at 348, 351–53 (finding that the recording of the contents of Katz’s 
conversation “violated the privacy upon which [Katz] justifiably relied while using the 
telephone booth”); id. at 360–61 (Harlan, J., concurring) (introducing the 
reasonable expectation of privacy test to clarify the majority’s holding); see also Peter 
C. Ormerod & Lawrence J. Trautman, A Descriptive Analysis of the Fourth Amendment 
and the Third-Party Doctrine in the Digital Age, 28 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 73, 116 (2018) 
(denoting Katz as the source of the “content and non-content” distinction in third-
party doctrine precedent). 
 71. On appeal, the defendant argued that a public telephone booth constitutes 
a constitutionally protected area and that physical trespass is not necessary to conduct an 
unconstitutional search and seizure.  Katz, 389 U.S. at 347, 349–51 (majority opinion). 
 72. Id. at 351. 
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touchstone of Fourth Amendment privacy rights.73  Under the Katz 
test, the Fourth Amendment recognizes and protects an expectation 
of privacy when an individual has “exhibited an actual (subjective) 
expectation of privacy” and that “expectation [is] one that society is 
prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”74 
Although some have lauded the Katz reasonable expectation of 
privacy test,75 others have severely criticized it.76  Nevertheless, the 
Supreme Court has generally applied the Katz test using a normative 
framework,77 balancing several factors; including, inter alia, assumption 
of risk, property interests, location, and expectations of privacy; to 
determine whether the Fourth Amendment protects a specific privacy 
interest.78  Therefore, understanding these limitations and normative 
factors may clarify the current scope of the Fourth Amendment. 
                                               
 73. Id. at 360–61 (Harlan, J., concurring); see California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 
211 (1986) (identifying Justice Harlan’s two-pronged test in Katz as the touchstone 
of Fourth Amendment privacy rights). 
 74. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361. 
 75. See, e.g., Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. 
L. REV. 349, 382 (1974) (championing Katz as the “watershed in fourth amendment 
jurisprudence”); James J. Tomkovicz, Beyond Secrecy for Secrecy’s Sake:  Toward an 
Expanded Vision of the Fourth Amendment Privacy Province, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 645, 649 
(1985) (recognizing the decision as “[t]he Katz Revolution”). 
 76. See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2265 (2018) (Gorsuch, 
J., dissenting) (“[W]e still don’t even know what [Katz’s] ‘reasonable expectation of 
privacy’ test is.  Is it supposed to pose an empirical question . . . or a normative 
one . . . ?  Either way brings problems.”); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 427 
(2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (“[The Katz test] involves a degree of circularity, and 
judges are apt to confuse their own expectations of privacy with those of the 
hypothetical reasonable person to which the Katz test looks.  In addition, the Katz test 
rests on the assumption that this hypothetical reasonable person has a well-developed 
and stable set of privacy expectations.”); ANDREW E. TASLITZ ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 107 (4th ed. 2010) (noting that the Supreme Court has never 
defined “reasonableness” pertaining to expectations of privacy nor stated whether 
the Court evaluates reasonableness through a majoritarian or normative framework); 
Orin S. Kerr, Katz Has Only One Step:  The Irrelevance of Subjective Expectations, 82 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 113, 114 (2015) (arguing that subjective expectations of privacy are 
irrelevant under Katz); Erik Luna, The Katz Jury, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 839, 846 (2008) 
(scrutinizing the Court’s post-Katz decisions as “outcome-based jurisprudence” that 
use “haphazard” and inconsistent analyses). 
 77. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2246 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating that, despite 
Katz’s majoritarian framing, the Court’s jurisprudence can only be understood 
through a normative framework that asks “whether a particular practice should be 
considered a search under the Fourth Amendment”). 
 78. See TASLITZ ET AL., supra note 76, at 107–09, 135–45 (noting that the Court 
becomes “society’s representative” when determining whether an expectation of 
privacy is objectively reasonable and identifying additional factors, such as social 
custom and legality or intimacy of activities involved). 
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B.   Limitations on Expectations of Privacy:  The Third-Party Doctrine 
Amongst one of the most controversial aspects of the Katz reasonable 
expectation of privacy test is the third-party doctrine.  Principled upon 
an assumption of the risk theory, the third-party doctrine mandates that 
“a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he 
voluntarily turns over to third parties.”79  The third-party doctrine has 
evolved from its misplaced trust doctrinal roots and now serves as an 
invaluable tool for the government to obtain records from third 
parties.80  This section briefly explains misplaced trust doctrine 
jurisprudence before exploring the third-party doctrine’s evolution and 
rationale. 
1. Misplaced trust doctrine 
The misplaced trust doctrine states that an individual waives his 
Fourth Amendment protections when he confides his wrongdoing to 
another person whom he mistakenly believes will not reveal it.81  The 
misplaced trust doctrine arose from cases, many decided before Katz, 
involving assertions of privacy interests in information confided to 
informants and undercover government agents.  For example, in On Lee 
v. United States,82 the Court held that the government did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment by equipping the defendant’s friend with a recording 
device, finding the recording device indistinguishable from an agent 
“eavesdropping outside an open window.”83  A decade later, in Lopez v. 
United States,84 the Court upheld an IRS agent covertly recording the 
defendant’s attempts to bribe the agent, concluding that the defendant 
risked that the bribe would be “accurately reproduced in court, whether 
by faultless memory or mechanical recording.”85  Similarly, in Hoffa v. 
                                               
 79. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (holding that even if one 
exhibits a subjective expectation of privacy in information voluntarily conveyed to a 
third party, such an expectation “is not one that society is prepared to recognize as 
‘reasonable’” (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring))). 
 80. Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 
75 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1083, 1084–86 (2002) (arguing that, inter alia, the government 
should regulate the transfer of personal information from the private sector to the 
government in a way that balances privacy and effective law enforcement). 
 81. Chris J. Chasin, The Revolution Will Be Tweeted, but the Tweets Will Be Subpoenaed:  
Reimagining Fourth Amendment Privacy to Protect Associational Anonymity, 2014 U. ILL. J.L. 
TECH. & POL’Y, 1, 18–19. 
 82. 343 U.S. 747 (1952). 
 83. Id. at 753–54. 
 84. 373 U.S. 427 (1963). 
 85. See id. at 439 (rejecting that the defendant had a right to rely on the IRS 
agent’s fallible memory). 
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United States,86 the Court held that the government did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment when the defendant confided in a colleague who, 
unbeknownst to the defendant, worked for police, and the colleague 
subsequently testified about the defendant’s statements.87  The Court noted 
that, as is “inherent in the condition[] of human society,” whenever an 
individual speaks he risks that he may be “eavesdropp[ed] or betrayed by an 
informer or deceived as to the identity of one with whom one deals.”88 
Post-Katz, the Court again upheld the misplaced trust doctrine in United 
States v. White,89 warning that an individual committing crimes assumes the 
risk that his companions may be reporting to the government.90  The 
following section explores how the misplaced trust doctrine served as a 
foundation for the third-party doctrine and delineates the rationales 
contouring this distinct doctrine. 
2. Third-party doctrine 
The modern third-party doctrine emerged from the misplaced trust 
doctrine.  In United States v. Miller,91 government agents subpoenaed the 
defendant’s bank records to investigate tax crimes.92  The United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit suppressed the bank records on the 
grounds that the government circumvented the defendant’s constitutional 
rights by obtaining the records from a third party,93 but the Supreme Court 
reversed in favor of the government.94  First, the Court examined the nature 
of the records and concluded that the bank records were not “private 
papers” but rather negotiable instruments exposed to bank employees 
during the ordinary course of business.95  Second, the Court cited the entire 
line of misplaced trust jurisprudence and held that the defendant could not 
reasonably expect privacy in records voluntarily conveyed to a third party, 
even if they conveyed the records only for a limited purpose.96 
                                               
 86. 385 U.S. 293 (1966). 
 87. Id. at 303. 
 88. Id. (quoting Lopez, 373 U.S. at 465 (Brennan, J., dissenting)). 
 89. 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (plurality opinion). 
 90. Id. at 751–52. 
 91. 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
 92. Id. at 437. 
 93. United States v. Miller, 500 F.2d 751, 757 (5th Cir. 1974) (citing Boyd v. 
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 622 (1886)), rev’d, 425 U.S. 435, 436 (1976). 
 94. Miller, 425 U.S. at 440. 
 95. See id. at 440–42 (noting that the defendant did not possess or own the bank 
records). 
 96. See id. at 443 (first citing United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751–52 (1971) 
(plurality opinion); then citing Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966); and 
then citing Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 439 (1963)). 
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Three years later, in Smith v. Maryland,97 the Court held that the 
defendant lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in telephone 
numbers dialed and subsequently intercepted by a pen register.98  
Applying the third-party doctrine refined by Miller, the Court held 
that the defendant voluntarily conveyed and exposed the dialed 
numbers to the telephone company and its operating equipment and, 
therefore, assumed the risk that the telephone company would disclose 
the dialed numbers to the police.99  Addressing the technological 
innovation of automatic call routing and billing, the Court refused to 
“make a crazy quilt of the Fourth Amendment” by grounding the 
reasonableness of an expectation of privacy in a company’s decision to use 
a human or automated operator.100 
In his dissent, Justice Marshall rebuked the majority’s holding, submitting 
that “[p]rivacy is not a discrete commodity, possessed absolutely or not at 
all.”101  Moreover, he doubted whether a person who knows that a 
telephone company records calls for billing purposes assumes that the 
company will convey his call information to the government.102  Justice 
Marshall asserted that “[i]mplicit in the concept of assumption of risk is 
some notion of choice” and noted that an individual lacks such choice 
where the individual must accept surveillance or forgo technology 
essential to modern life.103  Justice Marshall warned that making 
assumption of risk dispositive in determining reasonable expectations of 
privacy empowers the government to dictate the Fourth Amendment’s 
scope merely by providing prior notice of surveillance.104 
Third-party doctrine jurisprudence rests upon two underlying 
rationales:  voluntary conveyance and reduced expectations of privacy in 
                                               
 97. 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
 98. Id. at 745–46 (rejecting that the pen register constituted a Fourth 
Amendment search).  A pen register is “a device that records numbers dialed from a 
phone line.” United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 509 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 99. Smith, 442 U.S. at 744. 
 100. See id. at 745 (rejecting the defendant’s assertion that he possessed a 
reasonable expectation of privacy because a machine, rather than a human, 
ordinarily transferred his phone calls, and the machine did not record the 
defendant’s local calls). 
 101. Id. at 749 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 102. Id. 
 103. See id. at 749–50 (arguing that the concept of “assumption of risk” is diluted 
where “individuals have no realistic alternative”). 
 104. See id. (illustrating that the government could foreclose reasonable 
expectations of privacy in the contents of mail or phone calls merely by announcing 
its intent to monitor). 
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information knowingly shared with another.105  Derived from Smith and 
Miller,106 voluntary conveyance requires that a conveyance be intentional 
and presumably with the conveyor’s knowledge.107  However, consent 
does not subsume voluntariness,108 thus leading several scholars to 
advocate that the vulnerabilities of consent in online contracting, such 
as agreeing to the terms of a privacy policy, militate using consent as the 
dispositive touchstone of fair information practices.109  Some assert that a 
                                               
 105. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219–20 (2018) (identifying 
the reduced expectations of privacy and “voluntary exposure” justifications as 
integral to the third-party doctrine analysis). 
 106. See, e.g., Smith, 442 U.S. at 745 (rejecting the defendant’s expectation of 
privacy in the phone numbers on the grounds that they were voluntarily conveyed to 
the phone company, which had the equipment and right to record the numbers); 
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976) (observing that the defendant’s bank 
records “contain only information voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed to 
their employees in the ordinary course of business”). 
 107. Compare United States v. Stimler, 864 F.3d 253, 266 n.40 (3d Cir. 2017) 
(reaffirming In re Application of U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. 
Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 317–18 (3d Cir. 2010), 
which held that CSLI is involuntarily conveyed to wireless service providers because 
consumers are unlikely to know that their wireless providers collect and store 
historical CSLI), reh’g granted, vacated in part, No. 15-4094, 2018 WL 4139784 (3d Cir. 
Aug. 30, 2018), with United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 430 n.12 (4th Cir. 2016) 
(concluding that an individual voluntarily conveys historical CSLI to wireless 
providers as an inherent consequence of agreeing to use and using a cell phone and 
noting that voluntariness, as posited by Smith and Miller, “does not require 
contemporaneous recognition of every detail an individual conveys to a third party”), 
and United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 512 (11th Cir. 2015) (holding that CSLI is 
voluntarily conveyed because users must convey CSLI, like the phone numbers in 
Smith, to complete phone calls).  But see Steven M. Bellovin et al., It’s Too Complicated:  How 
the Internet Upends Katz, Smith, and Electronic Surveillance Law, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH., 1, 30 
(2016) (scrutinizing the Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation of Smith as conflating 
“information that is ‘necessarily’ conveyed” with “knowing, voluntary conveyance”). 
 108. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227, 248–49 (1973) (rejecting 
that consent alone authorizes a search of an individual not in custody and holding 
that the consent must be voluntarily given under the totality of the circumstances to 
satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement). 
 109. See Lisa M. Austin, Enough About Me:  Why Privacy Is About Power, Not Consent 
(or Harm), in A WORLD WITHOUT PRIVACY:  WHAT LAW CAN AND SHOULD DO? 189 
(Austin Sarat ed., 2015) (concluding that consent-based privacy models inadequately 
protect consumers considering “the emerging corporate-state nexus that has created 
such a striking surveillance infrastructure on the internet”); Woodrow Hartzog, The 
Inadequate, Invaluable Fair Information Practices, 76 MD. L. REV. 952, 956, 965–66 (2017) 
(arguing that fair information practices relying upon consent have ossified and must 
be revised).  Some scholars have described consenting online as “qualitatively 
different” than in the real world because of the greater disparity in bargaining power 
between internet users and online businesses.  See Wayne R. Barnes, Social Media and 
the Rise in Consumer Bargaining Power, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 661, 661–62 (2012) 
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consent-based framework turns privacy rules into “formalistic exercises 
designed to extract consent and use the gift of control” to shift risks to 
consumers.110  Others have noted that, although internet users are 
empowered to consent as they wish, this control may be “too much of a good 
thing” if users fatigue from consent requests.111  Moreover, the consent-
based framework may not adequately apply to modern information sharing 
practices in which the first parties with whom users interact are merely 
intermediaries for third parties.112 
The second rationale—a reduced expectation of privacy in 
information knowingly shared—analyzes the nature of the information 
sought to determine whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists 
in the content.113  For example, in Miller, the Court held that the 
defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents 
of his bank records because they were negotiable commercial instruments 
exposed to employees during the ordinary course of business.114  Similarly, 
the Court has recognized a reduced expectation of privacy in telephone 
numbers dialed because the numbers alone reveal limited quantities of 
information voluntarily conveyed to telephone companies to use a 
                                               
(explaining how social media bulletins have helped bridge the “complete and 
absolute” online bargaining disparity); Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Technoconsen(t)sus, 85 
WASH. U. L. REV. 529, 549–50, 556 (2007) (advocating for a “medium-specific contract 
doctrine of consent” guided by a “reasonable digital consumer standard” to reconcile 
contracting online and in the real world).  Scholars attribute this disparity to several 
factors.  See, e.g., Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting 
in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 480 (2002) (inability to ask an agent about 
terms); Matwyshyn, supra (easily manipulatable consent factors); Natasha Lomas & 
Romain Dillet, Terms and Conditions Are the Biggest Lie of Our Industry, TECHCRUNCH, 
https://techcrunch.com/2015/08/21/agree-to-disagree [https://perma.cc/4CF4-
2T94] (difficulty of reading policies). 
 110. Hartzog, supra note 109, at 964. 
 111. See id. at 975 (noting that, without any alternative, consent fatigue causes 
internet users to consent away their privacy); see also Roger Brownsword, Consent in 
Data Protection Law:  Privacy, Fair Processing and Confidentiality, in REINVENTING DATA 
PROTECTION? 83, 90 (Serge Gutwirth et al. eds., 2009) (warning about the dangers of the 
“routinisation” of consent in which internet users merely “tick the box” due to consent fatigue). 
 112. Hartzog, supra note 109, at 967–68 (noting that modern information sharing practices 
are predicated upon “individual-organization relationship[s]” between only two parties). 
 113. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976). 
 114. Id. 
2230 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:2209 
phone.115  However, an individual may still have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in information subject to a reduced expectation of privacy.116 
C. Piecing Together the Privacy that Remains 
The third-party doctrine has set bright-line boundaries constraining 
expectations of privacy in information voluntarily conveyed to others.  
However, after piecing together the privacy that remains, a disparity 
between the physical and virtual worlds becomes apparent.  While the 
Supreme Court has become increasingly reluctant to extend the third-
party doctrine to foreclose an expectation of privacy in one’s movement 
and location in the physical world, other courts have not hesitated to 
abridge expectations of privacy in an internet user’s movement from one 
website to another.  The following sections explore this divide, setting 
the stage for its reconciliation. 
1. Privacy interests in movements and location 
The Supreme Court has recognized a limited expectation of privacy in 
one’s location.117  However, the Court did not originally recognize such a 
right.  In United States v. Knotts,118 the government obtained consent from a 
chemical seller to place a beeper inside a chemical container that the 
defendants, suspected of manufacturing drugs, would later purchase.119  
The government used the beeper and visual surveillance to trace the 
chemicals to Knotts’s cabin and to obtain a search warrant.120  The Court 
rejected that the warrantless monitoring violated Knotts’s expectation of 
privacy in his movements and declined to find a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in one’s movement where a person travels on public 
thoroughfares, thus voluntarily conveying his movements to anyone in 
                                               
 115. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742–44 (1979) (noting that a pen register 
only collects the numbers dialed and that the defendant voluntarily exposed the 
numbers to the telephone company’s equipment during the ordinary course of 
business).  But see Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2492–93 (2014) (rejecting that 
phone numbers accompanied by “identifying information that an individual might 
add” in a phone’s call log are subject to a reduced expectation of privacy). 
 116. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219 (2018) (quoting Riley, 
134 S. Ct. at 2488) (“[T]he fact of ‘diminished privacy interests does not mean that 
the Fourth Amendment falls out of the picture entirely.’”). 
 117. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012) (holding that the 
government conducts a search when it installs a tracking device on a vehicle to 
monitor the vehicle’s movements). 
 118. 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
 119. Id. at 278. 
 120. Id. at 278–79 (noting that the government did not use the beeper after 
locating the cabin). 
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sight.121  The Court dismissed the argument that the government’s use of 
technology could lead to pervasive surveillance of citizens, but it reserved 
that “different constitutional principles may be applicable” if technology 
eventually enables the government to conduct “dragnet-type law 
enforcement practices.”122 
The Court circumscribed Knotts in United States v. Karo,123 in which 
a government informant notified the government that the defendants 
had ordered from the informant cans of chemicals for illicit drug activity.124  
Pursuant to a court order and the informant’s consent, the government 
placed a tracking beeper in one of the cans and used the beeper and visual 
surveillance to follow Karo to his house and to track the can within his 
house.125  Limiting Knotts, the Court held that monitoring a beeper in a 
private residence that is not open to visual surveillance constitutes an 
unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment.126 
Almost thirty years after Karo, the Court revisited privacy interests 
in an individual’s movements in United States v. Jones,127 in which the 
government installed a GPS device on the defendant’s vehicle and 
tracked its movements for twenty-eight days.128  Writing for the Court, 
Justice Scalia sidestepped the Katz test and applied the trespass 
doctrine, holding that the installation of the GPS device on the 
defendant’s vehicle and the monitoring of his movements constituted 
a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment.129  Justice Scalia 
                                               
 121. See id. at 279, 281–82, 285 (equating the warrantless beeper monitoring to a 
government agent physically following an automobile and positing that visual 
surveillance would have revealed the same information conveyed by the beeper). 
 122. See id. at 283–84 (explaining that, until the government conducts such 
pervasive and intrusive practices, “police efficiency” does not warrant 
unconstitutionality). 
 123. 468 U.S. 705 (1984). 
 124. Id. at 708. 
 125. Id. at 708–10. 
 126. See id. at 715–17 (emphasizing that, although beepers are less intrusive than 
physical searches, beepers reveal important details about the “the interior of the 
premises that the Government is extremely interested in knowing and that it could 
not have otherwise obtained without a warrant”). 
 127. 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
 128. Id. at 402–03.  The government actually obtained a warrant to install the GPS 
device; however, the government failed to install the device within the authorized 
ten-day period.  Id.  Conceding that it contravened the warrant, the government 
argued that it did not need a warrant to install and use the GPS tracker.  See id. at 402, 
403 n.1. 
 129. See id. at 404–05, 409 (clarifying that “the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-
privacy test has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test”).  
The Court did not answer whether the search was unreasonable because the 
argument was not raised below.  Id. at 413. 
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distinguished Jones from Knotts and Karo on the grounds that, unlike 
in Knotts and Karo where the government hid the beepers with the 
consent of third parties before the defendants obtained the bugged 
goods, Jones possessed the vehicle when the government installed 
and used the GPS device and, therefore, constituted a trespass.130 
Although Justice Scalia notably resurrected property-based privacy rights, 
the potency of Jones emanates from its two concurring opinions by Justice 
Alito and Justice Sotomayor.131  Justice Alito viewed Jones through Katz’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy test and recognized that technology can 
change expectations of privacy.132  Although he acknowledged the 
reasonableness of the short-term monitoring of a person’s public 
movements, Justice Alito cautioned that longer-term monitoring would 
violate most expectations of privacy, citing that society’s expectations 
espouse that “law enforcement agents and others would not—and . . . could 
not—secretly monitor and catalogue” a person’s every movement.133 
Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence doubted the utility of the majority’s 
trespass-based holding and reliance on the third-party doctrine.  Justice 
Sotomayor condemned the majority’s reliance on the trespass-doctrine, 
acknowledging that modern surveillance does not require physical 
trespass.134  Furthermore, Justice Sotomayor expounded upon Justice 
Alito’s concerns about expectations of privacy against comprehensive 
tracking of movements, highlighting that GPS tracking produces detailed 
records of movements that reveal “a wealth of detail” about “familial, 
political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.”135  Justice 
Sotomayor noted that these records can be stored and mined for years, 
                                               
 130. See id. at 404, 409–10 (stating that the government physically occupied private 
property to obtain the information). 
 131. See Margot Kaminski, Three Thoughts on U.S. v. Jones, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Jan. 24, 
2012), https://web.archive.org/web/20190219125855/https://concurringopinions 
.com/archives/2012/01/three-thoughts-on-u-s-v-jones.html [https://perma.cc/BR9H-
YEQB] (lauding Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence as having “the greatest practical impact” and 
denouncing Justice Alito’s concurrence as “the most dangerous part of these opinions”). 
 132. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 419, 427, 429 (Alito, J., concurring) (forecasting that 
people may eventually accept the tradeoff of increased convenience for decreased 
privacy). 
 133. See id. at 419, 430 (concluding that four weeks of tracking constituted “long-
term monitoring” that violated the defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy); 
see also United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 780 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Jones, 565 
U.S. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring)) (adding that technology has enabled the 
government to comprehensively track individuals in ways previously impossible). 
 134. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 414–15 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (forecasting that the 
government may eventually exploit tracking devices incorporated in vehicles and 
smart phones). 
 135. Id. at 415 (citing New York v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (N.Y. 2009)). 
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allowing the government to evade practical limitations that protect privacy 
rights.136  Most notably, Justice Sotomayor doubted the viability of the third-
party doctrine, labeling the doctrine as “ill suited to the digital age.”137 
2. Internet users’ expectations of privacy 
Courts and scholars have not uniformly recognized an expectation 
of privacy against tracking cookies or in browsing history.138  Generally, 
parties who have challenged tracking cookies as a violation of a person’s 
expectation of privacy in browsing history have relied upon the Stored 
Communications Act (“SCA”).139  Enacted as part of the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA),140 legislators 
implemented the SCA to extend Fourth Amendment privacy rights 
into the digital realm to protect service providers’ customers and 
                                               
 136. See id. at 415–16 (advancing that unchecked surveillance could “chill[] 
associational and expressive freedoms” and “alter the relationship between citizen 
and government in a way that is inimical to democratic society” (quoting United 
States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 285 (7th Cir. 2011) (Flaum, J., concurring), 
vacated by Cuevas-Perez, 565 U.S. 1189 (2012))). 
 137. See id. at 417 (suggesting reconsideration of the third-party doctrine in the 
digital age “in which people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to 
third parties” while “carrying out mundane tasks”). 
 138. Compare, e.g., In re Intuit Privacy Litig., 138 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1274–77, 1282 
(C.D. Cal. 2001) (holding that the plaintiffs’ complaint sufficiently claimed that 
placement of cookies on personal computers violated the SCA), and In re DoubleClick 
Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 508, 511, 513, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) 
(concluding that internet access constitutes an electronic communications service 
but dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims that DoubleClick violated, inter alia, the SCA and 
the Wiretap Act by placing cookies on the plaintiffs’ computers to track users across 
its network websites and holding that DoubleClick’s clients consented to DoubleClick 
intercepting the plaintiffs’ communications), with In re Facebook Internet Tracking 
Litig., 140 F. Supp. 3d 922, 936 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims that 
Facebook violated the SCA by tracking users’ browsing history using tracking 
technology on the grounds that the SCA does not apply to information locally stored 
on a computer and that personal computers do not constitute “facilities” or 
“electronic communication providers” under the SCA), and Orin S. Kerr, A User’s 
Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1214–15 (2004) (arguing that the SCA does not apply to tracking 
cookies on personal computers because personal computers are not a provider of 
electronic communication service (“ECS”)).  See also 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) (2012) 
(defining an ECS as any service that allows a user “to send or receive wire or electronic 
communications”). 
 139. 18 U.S.C. § 2701–2712 (2012). 
 140. Id. § 2510. 
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subscribers against “unauthorized access to, and disclosure of,” their 
stored electronic communications held by network service providers.141 
The SCA provides hierarchical protections depending on whether 
the information sought constitutes “content” or “non-content” of 
electronic communications.142  “Content” includes “any information 
concerning the substance, purport, or meaning of that 
communication.”143  The government must obtain a search warrant to 
acquire communications content.144 
Conversely, the SCA provides less protection for non-content 
information, such as “dialing, routing, addressing [or] signaling” 
information (“DRAS information”).145  The government may obtain 
non-content information; such as a subscriber’s name, address, 
communication connection records, and payment methods; pursuant 
to a warrant or less demanding forms of process, such as a § 2703(d) 
                                               
 141. See id. § 2510(12) (defining “electronic communications” as “any transfer of 
signs, signals, writing, images, . . . or intelligence of any nature); S. REP. NO. 99-541, 
at 5 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3559 (noting the disparate 
protections afforded to electronic communications compared to traditional mail and 
stating that “the law must advance with the technology to ensure the continued 
vitality of the fourth amendment”); Jennifer Daskal, The Un-Territoriality of Data, 125 
YALE L.J. 326, 361 (2015) (delineating the various levels of SCA protections); Kerr, 
supra note 138, at 1209–10, 1212 (explaining that the Fourth Amendment’s strong 
privacy protections in the physical world do not necessarily transfer into the digital 
realm of “ones and zeroes stored somewhere on somebody else’s computer”); see also 
William J. Stuntz, The Distribution of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1265, 1266 (1999) (“Privacy, in Fourth Amendment terms, is something that exists only 
in certain types of spaces; not surprisingly, the law protects it only where it exists.”). 
 142. See Eric R. Hinz, Note, A Distinctionless Distinction:  Why the RCS/ECS Distinction in 
the Stored Communications Act Does Not Work, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 489, 499 (2012) 
(delineating the various levels of protections afforded to the content of communications); 
see also Ormerod & Trautman, supra note 70, at 116 (denoting Katz as the source of the 
“content and non-content” distinction in third-party doctrine precedent). 
 143. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8) (2012); see also In re Zynga Privacy Litig., 750 F.3d 1098, 
1106 (9th Cir. 2014) (defining “contents” under the ECPA as “the intended message 
conveyed by the communication,” excluding message characteristics generated 
during the communication). 
 144. § 2703(a). 
 145. See id. § 3121(c) (authorizing the government to install and use pen registers 
or trap and trace devices to capture non-content information); Smith v. Maryland, 
442 U.S. 735, 743, 745–46 (1979) (holding that the government’s use of a pen register 
to record telephone numbers dialed, but not the content of the communications, did 
not constitute an unreasonable search); H.R. REP. NO. 107-236(I), at 53 (2001) 
(affirming Smith v. Maryland’s distinction between content and non-content 
information). 
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order or a subpoena.146  Thus, under the current legal framework, 
statutory privacy protections primarily turn on whether browsing 
history or individual Universal Resource Locators (“URLs”) constitute 
content or non-content. 
Several courts have recognized that a URL may include search terms 
that constitute content.147  In United States v. Forrester,148 the Ninth 
Circuit held that the government’s collection of IP addresses of visited 
websites using a mirroring device was indistinguishable from the pen 
register surveillance upheld in Smith.149  The court explained that IP 
addresses, like the telephone numbers in Smith, are affirmatively and 
voluntarily conveyed to third parties when a user navigates the 
internet, and that an IP address does not reveal the contents of the 
websites viewed.150  However, the court excluded from its holding 
techniques that allow the government to collect both the IP address 
and the URL of webpages visited because, unlike an IP address, a URL 
identifies specific webpages that a user visited, thus providing a more 
precise and revealing picture of the user’s internet activity.151 
Similarly, in In re Zynga Privacy Litigation,152 the Ninth Circuit 
reaffirmed that a URL may include content if search terms are 
                                               
 146. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(c)(1)(A)–(B), 2703(c)(2)(A)–(F) (2012); see, e.g., id. 
§ 2703(d) (delineating that the government may obtain a § 2703(d) order from a 
magistrate judge upon a mere showing of “specific and articulable facts” that the 
subscriber information sought is “relevant and material to an ongoing criminal 
investigation”). 
 147. See, e.g., In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Privacy Litig., 806 F.3d 
125, 137–38 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing [Redacted], No. PR/TT [Redacted], at 32 (FISA 
Ct. 2010), https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/1118/CLEANEDPRTT%202.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8NVK-CWDQ]) (surveying the sea changes in the classification 
of location identifiers as content or non-contents and acknowledging the “growing 
chorus” of judicial recognition that “some, if not most, queried URLs do contain 
content”); In re Zynga Privacy Litig., 750 F.3d at 1108–09 (acknowledging, in dicta, 
that “[u]nder some circumstances, a user’s request to a search engine for specific 
information could constitute a communication such that divulging a URL containing 
that search term to a third party could amount to disclosure of the contents of a 
communication”); United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510–11 n.6 (9th Cir. 
2008) (stating, in dicta, that surveillance techniques that collect both the IP addresses 
and URLs of webpages visited “might be more constitutionally problematic”). 
 148. 512 F.3d 500 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 149. Id. at 505, 511. 
 150. Id. at 510. 
 151. See id. at 510–11 n.6 (illustrating that IP addresses reveal “only that a person 
visited the New York Times’ website at http://www.nytimes.com,” whereas URLs 
“divulge the particular articles the person viewed”). 
 152. 750 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2014). 
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contained within the URL.153  The plaintiffs alleged that defendants 
Facebook and Zynga disclosed the contents of their electronic 
communications when they shared with third parties the internet users’ 
unique Facebook identifiers and the webpage from which the users 
clicked to play a Zynga social media game.154  Relying on the court’s 
holding in Forrester, the plaintiffs argued that the webpage addresses 
revealed contents because they disclosed what webpage the user 
previously viewed, proffering that “if a Facebook user who was gay and 
struggling to come out of the closet was viewing the Facebook page of 
a gay support group, and then clicked on an ad, the advertiser would 
know . . . that s/he was viewing the Facebook page of a gay support 
group just before navigating to their site.”155  However, the court 
rejected this argument on the grounds that webpage addresses alone 
“constitute addressing information” that does not reveal the contents 
of the communications.156  Although the Ninth Circuit acknowledged 
its dicta in Forrester, recognizing that a URL may contain search terms 
that constitute content, it rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the 
Facebook identifier and addressing information in Zynga resembled 
the search terms contemplated in Forrester.157 
Additionally, a recently declassified Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court (FISC) opinion explicitly rejected that “DRAS information and 
contents are ‘mutually exclusive.’”158  The FISC recognized that a URL 
may include search terms that constitute contents.159  Moreover, the 
Second Circuit recently held that plaintiffs may sue companies that use 
cookies to profile and sell anonymized browsing history—even if it 
does not contain personally identifiable information.160  Despite the 
                                               
 153. See id. at 1108–09 (citing Forrester, 512 F.3d at 509–11) (affirming the district 
court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claim for failing to allege that contents of electronic 
communications were divulged). 
 154. Id. at 1100, 1102–03. 
 155. Id. at 1108. 
 156. See id. (restating that, unlike the “contents of a communication,” the Fourth 
Amendment does not protect “record information about those communications”). 
 157. Id. at 1108–09. 
 158. [Redacted], No. PR/TT [Redacted], at 31 (FISA Ct. 
2010), https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/1118/CLEANEDPRTT%202.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8NVK-CWDQ]. 
 159. See id. at 32 (quoting In re Application of the United States for an Order 
Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register and Trap, 396 F. Supp. 2d 45, 49 (D. Mass. 
2005)) (noting that the search terms embedded in the URL reveal “‘the substance’ 
and ‘meaning’ of the communication . . . that the user is conducting a search for 
information on a particular topic”). 
 160. See Mount v. PulsePoint, Inc., 684 F. App’x 32, 34–35 (2d Cir. 2017) 
(concluding that neither case law nor the “common law tort of intrusion upon 
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United States’ small strides toward strengthening online privacy 
rights,161 U.S. courts have enhanced Fourth Amendment protections 
to address other facets of evolving technology. 
The Supreme Court has extended Fourth Amendment privacy 
rights to constrain the government’s use of technology to obtain new 
types of information about individuals.  In Kyllo v. United States,162 the 
Court held that the warrantless use of a thermal imaging device to 
detect heat emitted by heat lamps within a house constituted an 
unconstitutional search of the home.163  Writing for the majority, 
Justice Scalia opined that the holding preserved the “degree of 
privacy against government that existed when the Fourth 
Amendment was adopted” by limiting the government’s use of a 
device capable of obtaining information otherwise unascertainable 
without physical trespass into a constitutionally protected area.164  The 
Court declined to find the thermal imaging constitutional merely 
because it did not capture “‘intimate’ details,” refusing to partake in 
                                               
seclusion” require information to be personally identifiable to establish standing), 
aff’g No. Civ. 6592 (NRB), 2016 WL 5080131, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2016). 
 161. European courts have also cultivated an emerging expectation of privacy in 
browsing history.  A Belgian court enjoined Facebook from tracking non-Facebook 
users before they could even read its privacy policy and denoted the nonconsensual 
practice as “unfair and unlawful processing of personal data” contravening “the 
reasonable expectations of the non-registered user.”  Rechtbanken van Eerste Aanleg 
[Civ.Rb.] [Court of First Instance] Brussels, Nov. 9, 2015, Nederlandstalige 
Rechtbank van Eerste Aanleg, 2015, 25–26, 32 (Belg.), https://www.dataprotection 
authority.be/sites/privacycommission/files/documents/Judgement%20Belgian%2
0Privacy%20Commission%20v.%20Facebook%20-%2009-11-2015.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2698-M53X].  Although a court of appeals later overturned the 
decision against Facebook on other grounds, another Belgian court recently ruled 
that Facebook again violated Belgian privacy laws by collecting and selling users’ 
information obtained pursuant to inadequate, if any, consent.  Court of Appeals 
Brussels, Feb. 16, 2018 (Nl.) (18e k.) Nr. 2016/153/A, 64 (Belg.), https://www. 
dataprotectionauthority.be/sites/privacycommission/files/documents/Facebook_j
udgment_16022018.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZH8Q-W4FR] (holding that Belgian 
courts did not have jurisdiction over Facebook and finding that Belgium’s claim for 
injunctive relief was not urgent because Facebook had used tracking technology for 
three years by the time of filing); Natasha Lomas, Facebook’s Tracking of Non-Users Ruled 
Illegal Again, TECH CRUNCH (Feb. 2018), https://techcrunch.com/2018/02/19/ facebooks-
tracking-of-non-users-ruled-illegal-again [https://perma.cc/TL7H-SU73] (scrutinizing 
Facebook’s use of tracking pixels and tracking cookies to collect browsing history). 
 162. 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
 163. See id. at 29, 34, 40 (holding unconstitutional the government’s warrantless 
use of sense-enhancing technology not in general public use that allowed the 
government to obtain information otherwise unascertainable without physical 
trespass into a constitutionally protected area). 
 164. Id. at 34, 40. 
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any jurisprudential odyssey to determine “which home activities are 
‘intimate’ and which are not.”165  Moreover, the Court reaffirmed that 
inferences may constitute a search.166 
In Riley v. California,167 the Supreme Court recognized that 
searching a cell phone implicates privacy concerns not raised by 
searching physical records and held that the search incident to arrest 
doctrine does not permit warrantless searches of an individual’s 
phone, including the phone’s call logs and media storage.168  The 
Court recognized an expectation of privacy in non-content 
information call logs, distinguishing them from the phone numbers 
in Smith on the grounds that the call logs included “identifying 
information that an individual might add.”169  Furthermore, the Court 
highlighted that phones contain troves of different information that 
can reconstruct an individual’s private life back to even before an 
individual purchased the phone.170  The Court acknowledged that 
internet-enabled phones contain “qualitatively different” information, 
such as browsing history, which raise distinct privacy concerns.171 
Modern technology continues to test the bounds of precedent, and in 
Carpenter v. United States,172 the Court again recognized new technology 
and data that “does not fit neatly under existing precedents.”173 
                                               
 165. See id. at 38–39 (condemning such a rule as unworkable because the 
government could not discern in advance whether surveillance would capture 
“intimate” information). 
 166. See id. at 35–37 (citing United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984)) (refusing 
to “leave the homeowner at the mercy of advancing technology”).  But see Orin S. 
Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311, 320 (2012) 
(arguing that the “mosaic theory requires courts to apply the Fourth Amendment 
search doctrine to government conduct as a collective whole rather than in isolated 
steps”). 
 167. 573 U.S. 373 (2014). 
 168. Id. at 378–80, 386, 395, 403. 
 169. See id. at 400 (rejecting the government’s argument that Smith v. Maryland 
permits an officer to always search call logs). 
 170. See id. at 394–95 (citing Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 760 (2010)) 
(highlighting that, because of the pervasiveness of phones in modern society, phones 
safeguard “a digital record of nearly every aspect of [individuals’] lives—from the 
mundane to the intimate”). 
 171. Id. at 395–96 (observing that physical records do not contain browsing history 
that reveals private traits and details, such as medical well-being). 
 172. 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
 173. Id. at 2214–16 (acknowledging that historical CSLI touches upon precedent 
regarding expectations of privacy in physical movement and the third-party doctrine). 
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D.   Carpenter v. United States 
In Carpenter, police arrested several men suspected of robbing 
RadioShack and T-Mobile stores.174  After one suspect identified 
Timothy Carpenter as an accomplice, prosecutors obtained a § 2703(d) 
order to compel cell-providers to disclose Carpenter’s historical CSLI, 
which placed his phone near the robberies.175  The district court denied 
Carpenter’s motion to suppress the historical CSLI, rejecting that the 
government’s warrantless acquisition of his historical CSLI constituted an 
unreasonable search.176  The Sixth Circuit affirmed.177 
After granting certiorari, the Supreme Court addressed “whether 
the Government conducts a search under the Fourth Amendment 
when it accesses historical cell phone records that provide a 
comprehensive chronicle of the user’s past movements.”178  Writing 
for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts held that the compelled 
disclosure of historical CSLI constituted an unreasonable search in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment, and that the government must 
obtain a search warrant to acquire seven days or more of historical 
CSLI.179  Chief Justice Roberts noted that “requests for [CSLI] lie at 
the intersection” of jurisprudence addressing a person’s expectation 
of privacy in his physical movements and the third-party doctrine, and 
he proceeded pursuant to this dual-pronged analysis.180 
                                               
 174. Id. at 2212. 
 175. Id. at 2212–13 (noting that the government obtained 12,898 location points, 
charting Carpenter’s movement over 127 days); see 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012) 
(permitting the government to compel the disclosure of delineated call detail records 
(CDRs) when it “offers specific and articulable facts showing that there are 
reasonable grounds to believe” that the records or information sought “are relevant 
and material to an ongoing criminal investigation”). 
 176. Order Denying Motion to Suppress at *2–3, *6, United States v. Carpenter, 
No. 12-20218, 2013 WL 6385838 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 6, 2013). 
 177. United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 890 (6th Cir. 2016). 
 178. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2211. 
 179. See id. at 2211, 2217 n.3, 2220–21 (“It is sufficient for our purposes today to 
hold that accessing seven days of CSLI constitutes a Fourth Amendment search.”). 
 180. Id. at 2214–16.  Chief Justice Roberts concluded his review of physical location 
and movement privacy jurisprudence by acknowledging that the frameworks 
employed by the majority and concurring Justices in United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 
400 (2012), generally support that a person possesses a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in his physical location and movements.  Id. at 2215.  Conversely, Chief Justice 
Roberts concluded that Miller and Smith dictate that a person does not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily conveyed to a third 
party.  Id. at 2216 (first citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979); and then 
citing United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976)). 
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First, the Court found that Carpenter possessed a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his movements.  Like the GPS tracking in 
Jones, the Court noted that historical CSLI is a “detailed, encyclopedic, 
and effortlessly compiled” record of an individual’s every movement over 
several years.181  The Court emphasized that the comprehensiveness of CSLI 
provides “near perfect surveillance” that can reveal intimate details of life, 
including “familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual 
associations,” while circumventing practical counterbalances of government 
surveillance.182  It also noted the retrospective quality of historical CSLI that 
enables the government to “travel back in time” to track a person who, at 
that earlier time, the government would not have known to track.  The 
Court denounced the retrospective tracking of any phone in the United 
States since the practice is limited only by providers’ retention policies.183 
The Court proceeded to reject the government’s argument that the 
third-party doctrine defeated Carpenter’s expectation of privacy in 
his historical CSLI.184  The Court faulted the government for 
disregarding “the seismic shifts in digital technology” that transformed 
phone companies into an alert and infallible “nosy neighbor” recording 
the movements of every phone in the United States—providing a 
“distinct category of information” not contemplated in Smith or Miller.185  
Furthermore, the Court found that the two rationales underlying the third-
party doctrine—a reduced expectation of privacy in information shared 
with another and voluntary conveyance—do not apply to historical CSLI.186 
In determining that historical CSLI is not subject to reduced 
expectations of privacy, the Court evaluated the nature of the 
historical CSLI to evaluate whether there is a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in its contents.187  Accordingly, it distinguished the nature 
of historical CSLI from the telephone call records in Smith and the 
bank documents in Miller on the grounds that historical CSLI yields 
incomparably revealing information.188  Moreover, the Court posited that 
historical CSLI conformed to the Court’s reservation in Knotts about 
pervasive tracking, asserting that the comprehensive chronicling of a 
                                               
 181. Id. 
 182. See id. at 2217–18 (quoting Jones, 565 U.S. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring)) 
(comparing historical CSLI to an ankle monitor attached to all phone users). 
 183. Id. at 2218. 
 184. Id. at 2219. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. at 2219–20. 
 187. Id. at 2219 (quoting United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976)). 
 188. Id. (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979); Miller, 425 U.S. at 
442). 
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phone user’s movements exonerated historical CSLI from the confines of 
Smith and Miller.189 
Next, the Court found that cell phone users do not “voluntarily” share 
historical CSLI with providers because carrying a phone is “indispensable 
to participation in modern society” and users convey CSLI without any 
affirmative act on their part beyond powering up the device.190  In 
concluding that cell phones are integral to modern society, the Court only 
cited Riley v. California, which emphasized that more than 90% of 
American adults always carry their cell phone.191  Additionally, the 
Court acknowledged that there is almost “no way to avoid leaving 
behind a trail of location data” because CSLI is automatically 
conveyed and recorded if a phone is on.192 
Striving to not “embarrass the future,” the Court clarified that its 
holding did not extend to tower dumps, security cameras, 
investigative techniques used for national security or foreign affairs, 
or “other business records that might incidentally reveal location 
information.”193  The Court also explicitly stated that its decision did 
not overturn Smith or Miller.194  Despite its efforts to mitigate the 
doctrinal damage done, the Court left the third-party doctrine’s 
longevity and application dubious and doubtful.195  Four Justices 
                                               
 189. Id. at 2220; see United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 283–84 (1983) (reserving 
that “if such dragnet-type law enforcement practices . . . should eventually occur, 
there will be time enough then to determine whether different constitutional 
principles may be applicable”). 
 190. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220 (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385 
(2014)). 
 191. Riley, 573 U.S. at 395. 
 192. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220. 
 193. See id. (quoting Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 300 (1944)) 
(cautioning that courts must “tread carefully” when considering the legal 
implications arising from new technology). 
 194. See id. at 2220 (clarifying that it only declined to extend Smith and Miller to 
historical CSLI). 
 195. See id. at 2272 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (asserting that “Smith and Miller [are] on 
life support”); Paul Ohm, The Broad Reach of Carpenter v. United States, JUST SECURITY 
(June 27, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/58520/broad-reach-carpenter-v-united-
states [https://perma.cc/PD96-ATDC] (claiming that the third-party doctrine is 
“almost dead”).  But see Orin Kerr, Understanding the Supreme Court’s Carpenter 
Decision, LAWFARE (June 22, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/understanding-
supreme-courts-carpenter-decision [https://perma.cc/8NPZ-HE2M] (rejecting that 
the third-party doctrine is on life support and, instead, suggesting that the third-party 
doctrine merely has an “equilibrium-adjustment” cap on it); Harry Sandick & George 
LoBiondo, Insight:  Carpenter v. United States:  An Initial Assessment, BLOOMBERG L. 
(July 23, 2018), https://www.pbwt.com/content/uploads/2018/07/Carpenter-v.-
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dissented, underlining the inefficacy of the Court’s holding and 
resonating that the majority disregarded property rights, thus 
providing significant fodder for future Fourth Amendment 
challenges.196  However, this Comment will focus on their non-
property-based contributions. 
Beginning the trail of dissents, Justice Kennedy scrutinized the 
majority for interpreting Miller and Smith as creating a balancing test 
in which the privacy interests of each “‘qualitatively different 
category’ of information . . . must be weighed against the fact that the 
information has been disclosed to a third party.”197  Justice Kennedy 
faulted the majority for neither explaining why it adopted a seven-day 
rule nor providing factors to discern whether the Court’s holding 
extends beyond historical CSLI to information like browsing 
history.198  Similarly, Justice Alito doubted the utility of the Court’s 
holding in a society in which private companies—not the 
government—pose the greatest threats to privacy.199  In the last 
                                               
United-States-An-Initial-Assessment1-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/JXN8-56XH] (opining that 
interpreting Carpenter as nullifying the third-party doctrine would be a “stretch”). 
 196. See, e.g., Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2224–26 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (asserting 
that the Court “unhinge[d] Fourth Amendment doctrine from the property-based 
concepts” delineated by Miller and Smith); id. at 2235, 2240, 2242 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (highlighting that Carpenter retained no right or property interest in the 
CSLI records and esteeming the role of common law and property law when 
determining Fourth Amendment privacy rights); id. at 2272 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) 
(admonishing Carpenter’s counsel for omitting all property-based and positive law-
based arguments, noting that these omissions hinder “the development of a sound 
or fully protective Fourth Amendment jurisprudence”). 
 197. See id. at 2231–32 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 
2216 (majority opinion)) (asserting that even if Miller and Smith established a 
balancing test, a person’s privacy interest in his movements does not surmount the 
third-party doctrine). 
 198. Id. at 2234; see also Douglas Harris, Note, Carpenter v. United States:  How 
Many Cell Phone Location Points Constitute a Search Under the Fourth Amendment?, 13 DUKE 
J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 101, 115 (2018) (stating that identifying the line of 
the permissible amount of historical CSLI that the government may obtain is the most 
perplexing aspect of Carpenter).  The Court implicitly rejected Carpenter’s proposed 
twenty-four-hour rule without explaining whether or why the Court adopted the 
government’s seven-day rule.  See Reply Brief for Petitioner at 12, Carpenter v. United 
States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (No. 16-402) (arguing that the twenty-four-hour rule 
would provide the government with the benefit of the doubt and certainty); Brief for the 
United States at 55–56, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (No. 16-402) (justifying the seven-day rule 
on the grounds that the government commonly surveils suspects for at least one week). 
 199. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2261 (Alito, J., dissenting) (quipping that 
misleading the public to believe that the judiciary can protect it from private 
companies that collect and misuse personal data would be divisive and disserving 
compared to deferring to Congress for further legislation). 
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dissenting opinion, Justice Gorsuch scrutinized consent as a 
justification for the third-party doctrine and argued that consenting to 
allow a third party to access private property does not imply consent for 
the government to search the property.200  Justice Gorsuch denounced 
the consent-based explanation as merely “assumption of risk 
relabeled” as “‘consent[ing]’ to whatever risks are foreseeable.”201 
E. Where Carpenter Leaves the Fourth Amendment and Third-Party 
Doctrine 
Practitioners and scholars received Carpenter with mixed reviews.  
While scholar Daniel Solove opined that, despite being “the length of 
a Tolstoy novel,” Carpenter did not sufficiently further the legal plot,202 
other scholars esteem Carpenter as evincing the Court’s equivocal 
commitment to the third-party doctrine.203  Indeed, at face value, 
Carpenter only yields that the government must obtain a search warrant 
before acquiring more than seven days of historical CSLI.204  However, 
despite the Court’s limited holding, its reliance on comprehensive 
detail, pervasiveness, and involuntary conveyance suggests that the 
scope of Carpenter applies to information other than historical CSLI.205 
                                               
 200. Id. at 2263 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). Justice Gorsuch also rejected that 
“knowledge” or “clarity” justify the third-party doctrine.  Id. at 2263–64. 
 201. Id. at 2263. 
 202. Daniel Solove, Carpenter v. United States, Cell Phone Location Records, and the 
Third Party Doctrine, TEACH PRIVACY (July 1, 2018), https://teachprivacy.com/ 
carpenter-v-united-states-cell-phone-location-records-and-the-third-party-doctrine 
[https://perma.cc/5WCE-8R7B] (asserting that “a lot more was at stake in 
[Carpenter]” than the Court’s narrow holding addresses).  Solove argues that the 
Court squandered “the prime opportunity” to overrule the third-party doctrine.  Id. 
 203. See Nat’l Constitution Ctr., Does the Warrantless Search and Seizure of Cellphone 
Records Violate the Fourth Amendment, YOUTUBE (Oct. 31, 2017), https://www. 
youtube.com/watch?v=hW32k7x7zE0 [https://perma.cc/2BAS-AANW] (noting that 
the Court in Knotts indicated that it is not fully wedded to the third-party doctrine by 
reserving whether the public view doctrine permits the government to conduct 
dragnet surveillance of Americans using technology). 
 204. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 n.3 (majority opinion). 
 205. See Kate Fazzini, Supreme Court Ruling Requiring Warrant for Cellphone Searches 
Could Lead to a Flood of Lawsuits, CNBC (June 25, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/ 
2018/06/25/privacy-scotus-cell-data-carpenter-v-usa.html [https://perma.cc/BCE6-
M54X] (forecasting that Carpenter will force courts to address whether real-time CSLI 
should be treated differently than historical CSLI); Sharon Bradford Franklin, 
Carpenter and the End of Bulk Surveillance of Americans, LAWFARE (July 25, 2018), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/carpenter-and-end-bulk-surveillance-americans 
[https://perma.cc/9B82-DMG2] (advocating that Carpenter could be extended to non-
location-based CDRs); see also Timothy Edgar, The Supreme Court Just Struck a Blow Against Mass 
Surveillance, WASH. POST (June 25, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost. com/opinions/the-
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Some courts have already grappled with applying Carpenter in non-
historical CSLI cases.206  Most notably, in Naperville Smart Meter Awareness 
v. City of Naperville,207 the Seventh Circuit extended Carpenter to “smart 
meter” energy data, holding that the government conducted a search 
when it required residents to purchase energy from it and 
subsequently recorded their energy consumption every fifteen 
minutes.208  In rejecting that the third-party doctrine defeated residents’ 
expectation of privacy in their smart meter data merely because they 
“enter[ed] into a ‘voluntary relationship’ to purchase electricity from the 
city,”209 the court invoked Carpenter to dispel that a resident “assume[s] 
the risk of near constant monitoring by choosing to have electricity in 
her home.”210  Furthermore, the court viewed the smart meter data as 
potentially more invasive than the thermal imaging data collected in 
Kyllo because the comprehensiveness of the smart meter data enables 
the government to infer more confidently the interior details of the 
home.211  Naperville exemplifies the reality that the third-party 
doctrine must be reconsidered in the digital age.212  As technology 
increasingly integrates into modern society, perpetuating a rigid and 
                                               
supreme-court-just-struck-a-blow-against-mass-surveillance/2018/06/25/1b5ee510-7653-11e8-
b4b7-308400242c2e_story.html [https://perma.cc/ E4FE-MA2C] (noting that Carpenter raises 
serious issues for mass surveillance of telephone metadata). 
 206. See, e.g., United States v. Morel, 922 F.3d 1, 8–9 (1st Cir. 2019) (refusing to 
extend Carpenter to IP addresses); Naperville Smart Meter Awareness v. City of 
Naperville, 900 F.3d 521, 526–27 (7th Cir. 2018) (holding the third-party doctrine 
inapplicable to digital “smart meter” energy data); Florida v. Sylvestre, 254 So. 3d. 
986, 992 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018) (holding unconstitutional warrantless direct 
government surveillance of real-time CSLI); Mobley v. Georgia, 816 S.E.2d 769, 776–
77 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018) (holding defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in airbag control module data). 
 207. 900 F.3d 521 (7th Cir. 2018). 
 208. Id. at 527–29 (holding that the government conducted a search but, 
nevertheless, concluding that the search was reasonable because, inter alia, the 
government’s public utility workers—not law enforcement officials—conducted the 
search and without prosecutorial intent). 
 209. Id. at 527. 
 210. See id. (extrapolating that, if an individual does not “voluntarily ‘assume the 
risk’” of conveying CSLI, a homeowner does not voluntarily assume the risk of 
surveillance merely by having electricity). 
 211. See id. at 526 (distinguishing that, unlike the search in Kyllo that revealed only 
heat, the smart meter data can reveal when individuals are sleeping, eating, or 
vacationing). 
 212. See id. at 527 (holding that people do not surrender their legitimate 
expectations of privacy by choosing to have government supplied electricity in their 
homes); see also United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring) (submitting that the third-party doctrine is “ill suited to the digital age” 
and merits reconsideration). 
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unqualified third-party doctrine guarantees increasingly intrusive, 
“absurd and problematic” government surveillance.213 
III.    APPLYING CARPENTER TO BROWSING HISTORY COLLECTED BY 
TRACKING COOKIES 
The holding in Carpenter provides new fodder to establish an 
expectation of privacy in browsing history collected by tracking 
cookies.  Part III applies Carpenter’s holding to browsing history 
collected by tracking cookies, advocating that courts should recognize 
an expectation of privacy in browsing history.  First, Part III.A.1 
advances an expectation of privacy in the comprehensiveness of the 
information sought, thus affording browsing history heightened 
Fourth Amendment protections.  Next, Parts III.A.2–3 argue that the 
justifications for the third-party doctrine do not apply to browsing 
history collected by tracking cookies.  Finally, Part III.B asserts that a 
reconceptualized third-party doctrine should protect the private 
sector from government appropriation. 
A.   An Expectation of Privacy in the Comprehensiveness of the Information 
Sought 
The first step in extending Carpenter to browsing history collected by 
tracking cookies is recognizing an expectation of privacy in it.  Although 
the United States has yet to recognize an absolute expectation of privacy 
in browsing history or against tracking cookies, recent technology-
oriented Fourth Amendment jurisprudence supports an expectation 
of privacy in browsing history based on the comprehensiveness of the 
information sought.  In construing Carpenter to turn on the 
comprehensiveness of the information sought, rather than the type 
of information, Carpenter provides a foundation to strengthen privacy 
rights in the digital age. 
In forging an expectation of privacy in the comprehensiveness of 
the information sought, the concurring opinions of Justices 
Sotomayor and Alito in Jones take center stage, relegating back to 
understudy Justice Scalia’s trespass approach.214  In his concurrence, 
                                               
 213. See Note, If These Walls Could Talk:  The Smart Home and the Fourth Amendment 
Limits of the Third Party Doctrine, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1924, 1924–26 (2018) (illustrating 
the unreasonableness of applying the third-party doctrine to information obtained 
from a smart home). 
 214. See supra notes 131–37 and accompanying text (summarizing the concurring 
opinions of Justice Alito and Justice Sotomayor in Jones).  The Jones majority opinion, 
relying primarily upon trespass-based privacy rights, lends little support here because 
the Carpenter majority couches its opinion in “reasonable expectation of privacy” 
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Justice Alito posits that long-term monitoring would infringe society’s 
expectation of privacy that the government would not and could not 
“secretly monitor and catalogue” an individual’s every movement.215  
However, Justice Alito left unanswered a fundamental question:  Why 
does society expect that the government does not and will not covertly 
and comprehensively monitor an individual’s every movement?  Justice 
Sotomayor answers this question, expounding that comprehensive 
tracking threatens to expose the very personal details and “familial, 
political, professional, religious, and sexual associations” at the heart of 
even the earliest notions of privacy.216  Privacy does not concern general, 
uncontextualized location information; rather, it concerns the precise 
collection and aggregation of private, detailed information that an 
individual might not have otherwise disclosed and that no single 
record could have otherwise revealed.217 
                                               
terms.  Compare Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2214–16 (2018) (noting 
that Carpenter lies at the intersection of expectations of privacy in physical location 
and movements and the third-party doctrine’s limitation of those expectations), with 
id. at 2224 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (accusing the Court majority of “unhing[ing] 
the Fourth Amendment doctrine” from its property-based foundation), and United 
States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2011) (holding that the government physically 
trespassed on the defendant’s vehicle when it installed a GPS device on the 
defendant’s car and, therefore, conducted a search).  Furthermore, as noted by both 
Justices Alito and Sotomayor in Jones, the government can easily circumvent privacy 
rights grounded in property law if it uses technology to track individuals without 
physical trespass.  Jones, 565 U.S. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 425–26 
(Alito, J., concurring). 
 215. Jones, 565 U.S. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 216. See id. at 415–17 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citing New York v. Weaver, 909 
N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (N.Y. 2009)) (questioning the reasonableness of “permeating 
police surveillance” that reveals this information which can be misused and subjected 
to associational and expressive chilling) (quoting United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 
581, 595 (1948)); supra note 60 and accompanying text (recalling that privacy in 
colonial America safeguarded personal autonomy, emotional release, self-evaluation, 
and interpersonal communications, as well as the personal liberties inherently 
flowing from each). 
 217. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2490 (2014) (observing that the vast 
storage capacities of digital records implicates distinct privacy concerns compared to 
the limited information within a physical record); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 
34–35 (2001) (holding that the government’s use of sense-enhancing technology not 
in general public use that allowed the government to obtain, or infer, information 
otherwise unascertainable without physical trespass into a constitutionally protected 
area constituted a search and explaining that its holding preserves the “degree of 
privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted”); 
United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment protects 
people, not places.”); WESTIN, supra note 59 and accompanying text (defining privacy 
as “the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, 
how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to others”). 
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Chief Justice Roberts also supports this expectation of privacy in 
Carpenter when he clarified that the majority’s holding turns not upon 
use of a phone or an individual’s movements but on the “detailed 
chronicle of a person’s physical presence compiled every day, every 
moment, over several years.”218  Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit’s 
application of Carpenter in Naperville Smart Meter Awareness v. City of 
Naperville also supports this expectation of privacy.  As observed by 
one commentator, the government in Naperville supplied its residents 
with the energy and, therefore, already knew how much energy the 
homes used.219  However, the government’s comprehensive recording 
and saving of residents’ energy usage in short intervals, which enabled 
the government to infer private details about residents, led the court to 
hold that the exfiltration of the energy use data constituted a search.220  
Moreover, this expectation of privacy in comprehensiveness also 
accounts for the “seismic shifts in digital technology” that permit the 
government to track not only a specific internet user, but also to 
retrospectively track any internet user.221 
Admittedly, an expectation of privacy in the comprehensiveness of 
the information sought, and as applied to browsing history, is prone 
to criticisms posited by the dissenting Justices in Carpenter.  The 
expectation of privacy would likely require a bright line rule, like 
Carpenter’s seven-day rule, to identify “comprehensive” information 
requiring a warrant.222  However, as Justice Kennedy noted about 
historical CSLI, there is little reason seven days should demarcate 
requiring a warrant versus less demanding forms of compelled process.223  
                                               
 218. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220 (adding that “[s]uch a chronicle” transcends 
the scope of the privacy interests concerned in Smith and Miller). 
 219. Orin Kerr, Public Utility’s Recording of Home Energy Consumption Every 15 Minutes 
Is a “Search,” Seventh Circuit Rules, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 17, 2018), http:// 
reason.com/volokh/2018/08/17/public-utilitys-recording-of-home-energy 
[https://perma.cc/5CNL-35F3]. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Compare Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219 (noting that technological advancements 
transformed phone companies into an alert and infallible “nosy neighbor,” recording 
the movements of every phone), with Naperville Smart Meter Awareness v. City of 
Naperville, 900 F.3d 521, 526 (7th Cir. 2018) (condemning the recording and storage 
of smart meter energy data every fifteen minutes, which the government could 
retrospectively mine to infer more confidently details of a home’s interior). 
 222. See supra note 204 and accompanying text (noting that the Carpenter Court 
adopted a seven-day rule after the government proposed a seven-day rule and 
Carpenter proposed a twenty-four-hour rule). 
 223. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2233–34 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (scrutinizing the 
majority opinion for employing an arbitrary seven-day rule while failing to consider 
the reality of law enforcement investigations). 
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Thus, the central question becomes, “what makes information, or 
browsing history, comprehensive?”  Is it the amount of datapoints and 
their accuracy, or is it the interval at which they are collected?224 
Regardless of the final metric, the efficacy of this expectation of privacy is 
that it jettisons the nuanced, and oftentimes technical, analyses requiring 
courts to distinguish between “intimate” and “non-intimate”225 or “content” 
and “non-content.”226  Departing from an “intimacy” inquiry extends 
privacy protections to information that an internet user may view as private 
but which may not qualify as “intimate.”227  Additionally, this broader 
expectation of privacy does not depend upon the nuances of the “content” 
dichotomy that has only acknowledged privacy interests when a URL 
contained an internet user’s search terms.228  Just as the Court refused to 
make an expectation of privacy depend upon a company’s decision to 
automate its processes, an expectation of privacy in browsing history can no 
more justifiably turn on whether a URL is programmed to include a search 
term.229  Exonerated from the confines of “intimacy” and “content” 
inquiries, this expectation of privacy protects browsing history, 
regardless of whether it reveals support group webpages or social media 
                                               
 224. See id. at 2212 (majority opinion) (highlighting that the government collected 
more than 12,000 datapoints that could locate an individual within fifty meters); 
Naperville Smart Meter Awareness, 900 F.3d at 525–27 (focusing on how the collection 
of data every fifteen minutes allowed the government to infer more confidently 
details of a home’s interior); Harris, supra note 198 (noting that the identification of 
the permissible amount of historical CSLI that the government may obtain as the 
most perplexing aspect of Carpenter). 
 225. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 38–39 (2001) (rejecting a bright-line 
rule based on intimacy as unworkable for courts who would be required to determine 
which activities are “intimate”). 
 226. See supra Section II.C.2 (detailing the fine distinctions between “content” and 
“non-content” under the SCA). 
 227. See Solove, supra note 64, at 755 (illustrating how defining privacy through 
“intimacy” may exclude privacy interests in information such as political affiliations 
and religious beliefs that may be regarded as private but not intimate). 
 228. See supra notes 138–46 and accompanying text (surveying the technical 
nuances governing the expectation of privacy in URLs). 
 229. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979) (“We are not inclined to make 
a crazy quilt of the Fourth Amendment” where “the pattern of protection would be 
dictated by billing practices of a private corporation”). 
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games,230 simply because browsing history reveals comprehensive 
information about internet users.231 
If courts recognize an expectation of privacy in browsing history 
based on comprehensiveness, courts must then address whether the 
third-party doctrine eliminates an internet user’s expectation of privacy 
when tracking cookies collect browsing history.  Parts III.B.1–2 argue that 
the rationales underlying the third-party doctrine—reduced expectation of 
privacy in information knowingly shared and voluntary exposure—do not 
apply to browsing history collected by tracking cookies; therefore, the 
third-party doctrine does not eliminate internet users’ expectation of 
privacy in their browsing history. 
B.   The Third-Party Doctrine Does Not Apply to Browsing History 
1. Browsing history is subject to a heightened expectation of privacy 
Browsing history collected by tracking cookies is not subject to a 
reduced expectation of privacy because it is a comprehensive and 
pervasive record of an internet user’s online behavior.  Tracking 
cookies, like historical CSLI, have outgrown the confines delineated 
by Miller and Smith that have failed to accommodate new, “distinct 
categor[ies] of information” born from “the seismic shifts in digital 
technology.”232  In Carpenter, the Court found that historical CSLI 
conveyed troves of intimate information not found in the negotiable 
                                               
 230. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37–39 (declining to hold that privacy rights depend on 
the intimacy of the information sought, condemning such a rule as unworkable); In 
re Zynga Privacy Litig., 750 F.3d 1098, 1103 (9th Cir. 2014) (declining to find an 
expectation of privacy based on the contents of a webpage because the IP address 
constituted only “addressing information” and the website URLs did not contain 
search terms). 
 231. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415–17 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring) (questioning the reasonableness of “permeating police surveillance” 
that reveals information which can be misused and subjected to associational and 
expressive chilling) (quoting United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948)) (citing 
New York v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (N.Y. 2009)); Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34, 40 
(holding unconstitutional technology that allowed the government to obtain 
information about the interior of homes that was otherwise unascertainable without 
physical trespass into a constitutionally protected area); Naperville Smart Meter 
Awareness v. City of Naperville, 900 F.3d 521, 526–27 (7th Cir. 2018) (viewing smart 
meter data as potentially more invasive than the thermal imaging data collected in 
Kyllo because the comprehensiveness of the smart meter data enables the 
government to more confidently infer the interior details of a home); supra notes 42–
45 (discussing that browsing history is used to determine information about an 
internet user, such as political and religious beliefs, sex, and occupation, otherwise 
unavailable on the internet). 
 232. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2216, 2219 (2018). 
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bank documents in Miller or telephone numbers in Smith, which without 
more, “reveal[ed] little in the way of ‘identifying information.’”233  
Similarly, although cookies may have conceptually originated as mere 
tools to help a well-intentioned shopkeeper remember and relate to 
customers, today’s tracking cookies embody a “nosy” shopkeeper who 
alertly and infallibly records his customers’ browsing history to ensure 
that his shelves are always stocked with products matching each 
customer’s interests, associations, and beliefs.234 
The comprehensiveness of browsing history dispels any reduced 
expectation of privacy and supports a heightened expectation of 
privacy.  Browsing history, like the historical CSLI in Carpenter and GPS 
monitoring in Jones, can reveal personal details of life, including “familial, 
political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.”235  Similarly, like 
historical CSLI, tracking cookies generate a “detailed, encyclopedic, and 
effortlessly compiled” record of internet users’ browsing history for several 
years.236  Accordingly, browsing history implicates the retrospective 
tracking that Chief Justice Roberts denounced in Carpenter regarding 
historical CSLI and in Riley regarding information in cell phones, such as 
browsing history, that provide glimpses into users’ pasts.237 
However, unlike the government’s collection of historical CSLI, which 
a phone company can limit through its data retention policy, or 
information on a cell phone that a user may delete, companies who use 
cookies can mine them for years without limitation.238  Most internet users 
                                               
 233. Id. (first quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979); and then 
quoting Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2492–93 (2014)) (citing United States v. 
Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976)) (distinguishing that Miller and Smith involved 
“limited types of personal information”). 
 234. See id. (likening telephone providers collecting historical CSLI to an alert and 
infallible “nosy neighbor”); supra notes 32 & 33 (detailing how cookies evolved from 
tools that enhanced e-commerce sites’ customer relations to tools that help sell the 
customers). 
 235. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting Jones, 565 
U.S. at 430); see supra notes 42–45 and accompanying text (highlighting that third 
parties use browsing history to deduce information that an internet user may not have 
shared on the internet). 
 236. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216, 2218 (concluding that historical CSLI 
generates more invasive records than the GPS device in Jones). 
 237. See id. (observing that historical CSLI allows the government to “travel back 
in time” to reconstruct an individual’s movements); Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489 
(recognizing that a phone may contain information “dat[ing]to the purchase of the 
phone, or even earlier”). 
 238. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218 (noting that phone companies retain historical 
CSLI for approximately five years); Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2486 (addressing concerns 
about phone users deleting information contained in a phone through remote-
wiping or limiting access through encryption); GOOGLE GUIDE:  MAKING SEARCHING 
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alone cannot stop a tracking cookie from recording their browsing 
history.239  Even if an internet user requests for a third party to delete its 
tracking and Flash cookies, third parties are not legally obligated to comply 
in many instances.240  Moreover, tracking cookies may raise greater privacy 
concerns than historical CSLI as new technology derives more information 
from browsing history.241 
2. Browsing history is not voluntarily conveyed by tracking cookies 
Tracking cookies do not voluntarily convey browsing history to 
third parties because using the internet is integral to modern society 
and browsing history is collected without any affirmative action on behalf 
of the user.  Like cell phones, using the internet has become a “pervasive 
and insistent part of daily life.”242  Comparable to the 90% of American 
adults who always carry their cell phone,243 89% of Americans use the 
internet and 26% of Americans are “almost constantly” on the internet.244 
                                               
EVEN EASIER, www.googleguide.com/cookies.html [https://perma.cc/S6YM-MU6E] 
(explaining that cookies can last anywhere from a few minutes to up to years in the future). 
 239. See SOLTANI ET AL., supra note 49, at 158 (explaining that erasing a browser’s 
cookies, cache, search history, and private data will not delete Flash cookies). 
 240. E.g., supra notes 56–58 and accompanying text (noting that companies are 
only legally obligated to fulfill “Do Not Track” requests if the company commits to 
honoring them).  Compare, e.g., Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] Oct. 25, 
2017, 6 Ob 116/17b, https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/Justiz/JJT_ 
20171025_OGH0002_0060OB00116_17B0000_000/JJT_20171025_OGH0002_0060OB
00116_17B0000_000.html [https://perma.cc/V4NL-WAK5] (refusing to interpret the 
“right to be forgotten” as requiring Facebook to proactively delete content similar to 
content that an individual requested be deleted), with Data Policy:  How Can I Manage Or 
Delete Information About Me?, FACEBOOK, https:// www.facebook.com/about/privacy 
[https://perma.cc/F9HP-UBWL] (stating that Facebook retains user data “until it is 
no longer necessary to provide our services and Facebook Products or until your 
account is deleted—whichever comes first”). 
 241. See Naperville Smart Meter Awareness v. City of Naperville, 900 F.3d 521, 526–
27 (7th Cir. 2018) (voicing that the smart meter data raised greater privacy concerns 
than the thermal imaging in Kyllo because smart meter data allowed the government 
to more confidently deduce intimate details of the home); see also Carpenter, 138 S. 
Ct. at 2218–19 (concluding that, despite historical CSLI being less accurate than GPS 
monitoring, GPS monitoring jurisprudence governed it because the Court must, as 
stated in Kyllo, consider “more sophisticated systems that are already in use or in 
development” (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 36 (2001))). 
 242. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484). 
 243. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2490. 
 244. Supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
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Furthermore, tracking cookies set and convey browsing history without 
any affirmative act on behalf of the user.245  For example, the pervasive 
Facebook “Like” button embedded on a non-Facebook website sets and 
reads tracking cookies in an internet user’s computer without the user 
ever visiting the Facebook website.246  Labeling such tracking as 
“voluntary” is problematic because an internet user may not know that a 
non-Facebook website features a Facebook “Like” button before visiting 
the website.247  Moreover, as using the internet becomes increasingly 
central to modern society, individuals do not “voluntarily” assume the 
risk of surveillance through tracking cookies merely because they 
choose to access the internet.248 
Moreover, internet users do not voluntarily convey their browsing 
history collected by tracking cookies because internet users cannot 
effectively manage or control the sharing of their information.  
Companies intentionally implement privacy practices, such as the use 
of Flash cookies and non-compliance with “Do Not Track” requests, 
that nullify internet users’ control over their information online.249 
Additionally, internet users do not give meaningful consent when 
agreeing to a website’s cookie policy.  Even if an astute internet user 
reads a website’s privacy policy before agreeing to it, most privacy 
                                               
 245. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220 (recognizing that cell phones automatically 
record historical CSLI, without any affirmative act from users other than turning on 
their cell phone). 
 246. See Gillmore, supra note 39 (noting that tracking cookies embedded in 
Facebook “Like” buttons on other websites enable Facebook to identify the website 
on which users found the “Like” button and to track their browsing history). 
 247. See supra notes 106–07 and accompanying text (recalling that voluntary 
conveyance requires that a conveyance be intentional and presumably with the 
conveyor’s knowledge).  Additionally, European courts have rejected such tracking 
as “voluntary,” decrying the practices as “unfair and unlawful” in violation of the 
“reasonable expectations of the non-registered user.”  See supra note 161 (detailing 
how European courts have addressed tracking cookies). 
 248. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 749–50 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(decrying that a person cannot assume a risk where “unless a person is prepared to 
forgo use of what for many has become a personal or professional necessity, he 
cannot help but accept the risk of surveillance”); Naperville Smart Meter Awareness 
v. City of Naperville, 900 F.3d 521, 527 (7th Cir. 2018) (rejecting that individuals, by 
ascertaining a common utility in their homes, “assume the risk of near constant 
monitoring”); Bellovin et al., supra note 107, at 1, 28–31 (rejecting that information 
that must be disclosed to use a service is necessarily “voluntarily conveyed”). 
 249. See supra notes 54–57 and accompanying text (noting the strategic use of 
Flash cookies and non-compliance with “Do Not Track” requests to perpetuate online 
tracking, even after internet users attempt to stop it); see also Smith, 442 U.S. at 749–
50 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (doubting that one can assume a risk without any 
reasonable alternative). 
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policies do not sufficiently disclose how the user’s information, 
including browsing history, will be tracked and conveyed to third 
parties.250  As Justice Gorsuch noted in his Carpenter dissent, consent 
cannot be dispositive in the third-party doctrine because the doctrine 
then merely equates to agreeing to “whatever risks are foreseeable.”251  
In the digital age, allowing the third-party doctrine to turn on 
consent, and thus foreseeability, effectively turns consent into a 
boilerplate, “formalistic exercise[],” that empowers the government 
to define internet users’ expectations of privacy by legislating that 
certain notices be provided to users in privacy policies.252  
Considering that internet users are unable to negotiate the terms of 
privacy policies, a modern privacy framework in which the third-party 
doctrine can turn on consent when an internet user “[has] no realistic 
alternative” but to submit to surveillance or to forgo technology 
essential to modern life only furtherly imbalances the equilibrium of 
privacy rights and bargaining power online.253 
C.   Recommendation:  Returning to a Misplaced Trust Third-Party Doctrine 
In his dissenting opinion in Carpenter, Justice Alito recognized that, 
“today . . . some of the greatest threats to individual privacy may 
come” not from the government but “from powerful private 
companies,” and that Carpenter would not protect the public from 
“this looming threat.”254  While he may have correctly identified that 
private companies now “collect and sometimes misuse vast quantities of 
data about the lives of ordinary Americans,” Justice Alito understates the 
threat that the federal government still poses in this paradigm.255 
                                               
 250. See LIBERT, supra note 54, at 212 (illustrating that website privacy policies 
disparately disclose the conveyance of user information to certain third parties while 
omitting the conveyance to other discreet third parties). 
 251. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2263 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., 
dissenting). 
 252. See Hartzog, supra note 109 (noting that the formalization of consent 
threatens its integrity); see also Smith, 442 U.S. at 750 (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that the proper framework for determining what risks individuals assume is 
based on the “risks he should be forced to assume in a free and open society”). 
 253. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 749–50 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (doubting that an 
individual assumes the risk of being surveilled where the individual must choose 
between forgoing an important service or being surveilled); Kerr, supra note 195 
(positing that Carpenter placed an “equilibrium-adjustment” cap on the third-party 
doctrine’s application to historical CSLI). 
 254. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2261 (Alito, J., dissenting); see Solove, supra note 80, at 
1092 (arguing that “the Internet has the potential to become one of the 
government’s greatest information gathering tools”). 
 255. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2261 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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Under the current third-party doctrine, the government views all 
persons and entities as prospective undercover agents or informants 
because the law requires only a subpoena or court order to compel 
them to disclose internet users’ browsing history.256  The current legal 
framework, encompassing the Fourth Amendment, third-party 
doctrine, and SCA do not reflect societal expectations that companies 
are not just repositories but also fiduciaries.257  The law must 
recognize the distinction between the private and public sector—that 
not every person and entity is an informant or undercover agent—
and must continue to evolve to regulate the conveyance of private 
individuals’ information to the government.258  Thus, the third-party 
doctrine has strayed too far from its misplaced trust doctrinal roots to 
apply the third-party doctrine in the digital age.  Courts should 
reform the third-party doctrine to adapt and promote the 
information practices of the digital age. 
A reconceptualized third-party doctrine should recognize the 
absence of retrospective surveillance in most misplaced trust cases 
and require the government to obtain a warrant when the 
government seeks to acquire information voluntarily conveyed to a 
third party not employed or associated with the government when the 
information was originally conveyed.  Generally, in misplaced trust 
doctrine jurisprudence an informant or undercover agent conveyed 
the defendants’ “private” information to the government.259  
However, more narrowly, these informants and undercover agents 
were typically already current government employees or associates.260  
These cases did not involve the government constructively employing 
or appropriating an individual or entity to disclose retrospective 
information that they would not have agreed to disclose at the time 
of the original conveyance.  A reconceptualized doctrine need not 
question the principles of Hoffa and White, in which the conveyors 
                                               
 256. See supra notes 145–46 and accompanying text (delineating the various 
compulsory process means through which the government can obtain browsing history). 
 257. See Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Fourth Amendment Fiduciaries, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 
611, 617, 619–20 (2015) (arguing that Smith and Miller are the progeny of conflating the 
disclosure of information to a company and the exposure of information to the public). 
 258. See Solove, supra note 80, at 1086–87 (arguing that the Fourth Amendment 
must provide new protections to protect citizens from the “digital biographies” held 
by third parties). 
 259. See supra Section II.B.1 (chronicling the development of the misplaced trust 
doctrine). 
 260. See, e.g., Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 428 (1963) (involving a then-
employed IRS agent); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 749 (1952) (involving 
an undercover agent already working for the government). 
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voluntarily disclosed the information to the government despite not 
being associated with the government when the information was 
originally conveyed, because individuals and entities should be free 
to voluntarily convey information to the government to promote 
effective law enforcement.261 
Furthermore, a more restrained third-party doctrine that recognizes 
that an individual does not relinquish all expectations of privacy in 
comprehensive browsing history disclosed to a third party mitigates the 
burden on companies to defend the rights of internet users.  As legal 
reforms diminish internet users’ expectations of privacy, private 
companies have emerged as the only party positioned to advocate for 
users’ privacy rights.262  However, companies may be unwilling or unable 
to challenge infringements upon users’ privacy,263 marring the frontiers 
of data privacy law with barren plains in which “there is no one who is 
both in the position and legally entitled to challenge the search or 
seizure on Fourth Amendment grounds . . . thus eliminating one of the 
most powerful checks on government overreach.”264  If internet users 
possess a cognizable expectation of privacy in their browsing history, 
they can challenge these government searches, consequently 
alleviating the vigilante burden on companies and helping to restore 
the equilibrium between internet users and the government.265 
American society continues to adopt evolving technology, and a 
third-party doctrine that does not adapt to these changes promises to 
fundamentally change the relations between citizens, companies, and 
                                               
 261. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 746–47, 747 n.1 (1971) (plurality 
opinion) (involving an informant; however, the Court declined to determine 
whether his employ was consensual); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 295 (1966) 
(involving a witness who conveyed the defendant’s incriminatory statements to the 
government). 
 262. See, e.g., Letter from Tim Cook, CEO, Apple Inc., to Apple Customers, (Feb. 
16, 2016), https://www.apple.com/customer-letter [https://perma.cc/ML3S-HEF2] 
(reaffirming Apple’s refusal to help the government circumvent its encryption 
safeguards because doing so would effectively compromise its customers’ information 
privacy and security); see also Kyriades, supra note 9 (criticizing the European Union’s e-
Evidence proposal, which would allow European Union member states to circumvent 
prolonged judicial processes and to obtain digital evidence directly from service 
providers, as delegating the vindication of individuals’ rights to private companies). 
 263. Supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing the legal and practical 
restraints that hinder the vindication of privacy rights). 
 264. Daskal, supra note 9, at 441 (emphasis omitted). 
 265. See Kerr, supra note 195 (viewing sea changes in Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence as “equilibrium adjustments”). 
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government.266  A third-party doctrine that distinguishes between data 
voluntarily conveyed, as opposed to data retrospectively obtained 
through the compulsion of private individuals and entities, affords 
privacy protections that promote trust and progress in information 
relationships between the private and public sectors.267 
CONCLUSION 
Although Carpenter v. United States represents a positive step toward 
strengthening privacy rights in the digital age, its holding must be 
extended to other digital information to adequately safeguard privacy.  
Currently, databases of profiles of internet users serve as “one-stop 
shops” for the government to fish for suspects—with nothing in its 
tacklebox except undemanding forms of process.  However, Carpenter 
and other technology-oriented Fourth Amendment cases support an 
emerging expectation of privacy in the comprehensiveness of digital 
information that could remedy this privacy concern by extending 
Carpenter’s heightened Fourth Amendment protections to browsing 
history collected by tracking cookies.  Like historical CSLI, tracking cookies 
involuntarily, comprehensively, and infallibly record browsing history that 
reveals, directly or indirectly, details about internet users; therefore, the 
third-party doctrine does not apply to browsing history collected by 
tracking cookies. 
Extending Carpenter to browsing history collected by tracking cookies 
pioneers more than merely granting internet users additional privacy 
rights.  It also forges order in the Wild West of the internet where 
legislation and regulation have consistently lagged behind advancing 
technology, neglecting the government’s gradual appropriation of 
private entities.  Therefore, courts and privacy advocates should 
interpret Carpenter beyond its four-corners to reclaim an equitable 
stake in the digital age privacy landscape. 
                                               
 266. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415–16 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring) (advancing that such unchecked surveillance could “chill[] associational 
and expressive freedoms” and “alter the relationship between citizen and 
government in a way that is inimical to democratic society” (quoting United States v. 
Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 285 (7th Cir. 2011) (Flaum, J., concurring))); White, 401 
U.S. at 787 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (voicing that third-party surveillance must be 
viewed as “undermin[ing] that confidence and sense of security in dealing with one 
another that is characteristic of individual relationships between citizens in a free 
society”). 
 267. See Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, 
19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 431, 434 (2016) (advocating that privacy laws should 
strengthen and foster trust in information relationships but commentating that 
modern privacy laws do not). 
